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SECTION I: CO-AUTHORS' INTRODUCTION
The following article is a tripartite effort by Mitchell Berger and Grace
E. Robson, members of the Florida Bar; John B. Anderson, a member of the
Nova Southeastern University's Shepard Broad Law Center faculty; and a
team of two of the students at that law school, Jason Blank and Tom Brogan,
to examine the subject of ballot access for non-major party candidates in
presidential elections in the wake of the recent decision of the Supreme
Court of Florida in Reform Party of Florida v. Black.' Mr. Berger has fur-
nished a critical analysis of that decision. Our team of students has cata-
logued the ballot access laws of the fifty states and the District of Columbia.
John B. Anderson has reviewed United States Supreme Court decisions on
the subject of ballot access specifically, and then also more generally on the
way in which they reflect on the electoral process; a process which for a cen-
tury and a half has been dominated by our two major parties. His criticism
of the resulting duopoly of political power and control should be attributed to
him alone and not to the other members of this collaborative effort. How-
ever, both Mr. Berger and Mr. Anderson support the idea of a constitutional
amendment putting forth an affirmative right to vote as both necessary and
desirable as a predicate for any effort to achieve a more uniform approach to
ballot access in future presidential contests. We also join in our appreciation
for the research assistance of Messrs. Blank and Brogan and their contribu-
tion to our joint effort.
1. 885 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 2004).
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SECTION II: THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS IN
ELECTION 2000 LIVE ON: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA CASE, REFORM PARTY OF
FLORIDA v. BLACK
MITCHELL W. BERGER
GRACE E. ROBSON
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent elections have raised questions and concerns regarding a per-
son's ability to "get on the ballot." Should there be restrictions? Are the
restrictions in place sufficient?
Currently, each state has laws governing the requirements for an indi-
vidual to get on the general election ballot as a candidate for President of the
United States.2 This article critically analyzes the recent Supreme Court of
Florida case pertaining to ballot access for minor party candidates, Reform
Party of Florida v. Black.3 More specifically, this article discusses the appli-
cable Florida law and the shortcomings of the majority's decision in interpre-
tation thereof. In addition, this article discusses how to prevent the courts
from being confronted with making decisions that fail to apply the law. This
solution proposes an amendment to the United States Constitution that would
mandate: any eligible registered voter in the United States and the District of
Columbia would have the right to vote for an elector in his or her respective
place of residence (or directly for the President if the electoral college were
abolished); that equal machinery be used to count the votes; and that uniform
standards be provided for ballot access with respect to candidates seeking
election to the office of President of the United States.
The judiciary's role is to interpret laws.4 In fulfilling this task, courts
routinely use canons of construction to construe statutes, whether they are
state, federal, or otherwise. However, on September 17, 2004, when the Su-
preme Court of Florida decided the case Reform Party of Florida, the major-
ity failed to apply basic rules of statutory construction and ignored uncontro-
verted evidence in ruling that Ralph Nader and Peter Camejo should be listed
as presidential and vice-presidential candidates on Florida's general election
2. See infra APPENDIX.
3. See generally Reform Party of Fla., 885 So. 2d at 303-21.
4. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616-17 n.7 (1999).
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ballot. 5 Regardless of party affiliation, a review of this case shows that the
majority failed to do its job, which in this case, was interpreting a Florida
statute.6
A. Florida Legislature Modified Ballot Access Law
In 1999, the Florida Legislature uncoupled the requirement of gathering
signatures and affiliating with a national party.7 The current form of the stat-
5. See Reform Party of Fla., 885 So. 2d at 304.
6. See id. at 312.
7. See FLA. STAT. § 103.021(3) (2004). This section provides:
Candidates for President and Vice President with no party affiliation may have their names
printed on the general election ballots if a petition is signed by 1 percent of the registered elec-
tors of this state, as shown by the compilation by the Department of State for the last preceding
general election. A separate petition from each county for which signatures are solicited shall
be submitted to the supervisor of elections of the respective county no later than July 15 of
each presidential election year. The supervisor shall check the names and, on or before the
date of the first primary, shall certify the number shown as registered electors of the county.
The supervisor shall be paid by the person requesting the certification the cost of checking the
petitions as prescribed in s. 99.097. The supervisor shall then forward the certificate to the
Department of State which shall determine whether or not the percentage factor required in this
section has been met. When the percentage factor required in this section has been met, the
Department of State shall order the names of the candidates for whom the petition was circu-
lated to be included on the ballot and shall permit the required number of persons to be certi-
fied as electors in the same manner as party candidates.
Id. See also section 103.021(4), Florida Statutes, which provides:
(a) A minor party that is affiliated with a national party holding a national convention to nomi-
nate candidates for President and Vice President of the United States may have the names of its
candidates for President and Vice President of the United States printed on the general election
ballot by filing with the Department of State a certificate naming the candidates for President
and Vice President and listing the required number of persons to serve as electors. Notification
to the Department of State under this subsection shall be made by September 1 of the year in
which the election is held. When the Department of State has been so notified, it shall order
the names of the candidates nominated by the minor party to be included on the ballot and
shall permit the required number of persons to be certified as electors in the same manner as
other party candidates.
(b) A minor party that is not affiliated with a national party holding a national convention to
nominate candidates for President and Vice President of the United States may have the names
of its candidates for President and Vice President printed on the general election ballot if a pe-
tition is signed by 1 percent of the registered electors of this state, as shown by the compilation
by the Department of State for the preceding general election. A separate petition from each
county for which signatures are solicited shall be submitted to the supervisors of elections of
the respective county no later than July 15 of each presidential election year. The supervisor
shall check the names and, on or before the date of the first primary, shall certify the number
shown as registered electors of the county. The supervisor shall be paid by the person request-
ing the certification the cost of checking the petitions as prescribed in s. 99.097. The supervi-
sor shall then forward the certificate to the Department of State, which shall determine whether
or not the percentage factor required in this section has been met. When the percentage factor
required in this section has been met, the Department of State shall order the names of the can-
didates for whom the petition was circulated to be included on the ballot and shall permit the
required number of persons to be certified as electors in the same manner as other party candi-
dates.
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ute provides that a minor party candidate can get on the general election bal-
lot as a presidential candidate if the candidate either obtains a petition signed
by one percent of the Florida registered voters or if the minor party is affili-
ated with a national party holding a national convention to nominate candi-
dates for President and Vice President of the United States.8
B. Procedural History
On August 31, 2004, Ralph Nader and Peter Camejo submitted papers
to the Secretary of State of Florida pursuant to section 103.021(4)(a) of the
Florida Statutes in order to be placed as Reform Party candidates for Presi-
dent and Vice-President on the ballot for the general election scheduled for
November 2, 2004.' Governor Bush certified the Reform Party slate to the
Florida Secretary of State who certified "Nader and Camejo be placed on the
2004 Florida presidential ballot."1° Complaints were filed against the Secre-
tary of State, Nader, and Camejo alleging that Nader and Camejo were not
"'minor party' candidates affiliated with a national party" as required by
section 103.021(4)(a) of the Florida Statutes, but were "independent candi-
dates who use[d] the name 'Reform Party of Florida' to claim affiliation with
the national Reform Party where no affiliation actually exist[ed].", The
Circuit Court for the Second Judicial District, in and for Leon County, issued
a preliminary injunction enjoining the Secretary of State of Florida from cer-
tifying Nader and Camejo as candidates for the Florida 2004 presidential
ballot, finding that: 1) "the Reform Party USA is not a 'national party[;]"' 2)
"Nader and Camejo were not nominated in a 'national convention"' because
they "were endorsed by the party via a conference telephone call," which
"did not follow the Reform Party USA's own definition of a 'national con-
vention"' and further, "an April 2002 letter from the Chairman of the Reform
Party of Florida shows that the Florida sector [has] disaffiliated from the
national party[;]" 3) "the Reform Party of Florida is not affiliated with the
Reform Party USA[;]" and 4) "Florida has important interests in enforcing its
election laws, ensuring that only qualified candidates appear on its ballot,
protecting the integrity of the ballot and election process, and preventing
voter confusion during the election.' 2 The preliminary injunction issued by
the circuit court was appealed by Nader and Camejo to the First District
§ 103.021(4).
8. See FLA. STAT. § 103.021(3)-(4) (2004).
9. See Reform Party of Fla., 885 So. 2d at 304.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 304-05.
12. Id. at 305-06.
2005]
NOVA LA W REVIEW
Court of Appeal, and a stay of the injunction, pending review, was also
sought. 3 In addition, the Secretary of State of Florida filed a notice of ap-
peal invoking an automatic stay of the injunction pursuant to rule 9.31 O(b)(2)
of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure and accordingly directed the
supervisors of elections to include Nader and Camejo on the ballot. 4 The
First District Court of Appeal certified the appeal of the order to the Supreme
Court of Florida as requiring the immediate resolution pursuant to rule 9.125
of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.5 The Supreme Court of Flor-
ida agreed to accept jurisdiction while permitting the litigation to continue in
circuit court, in order to bring the case to judgment and to determine any
motions relating to the automatic stay of the judgment the Secretary of State
of Florida was attempting to invoke. 6 While the circuit court was consider-
ing motions to vacate the automatic stay, Nader, Camejo, and the Reform
Party of Florida filed a petition in the United States District Court to remove
the case to federal court, which was met with an emergency motion to re-
mand the matter back to state court.' 7 The district court remanded the matter
to state court, finding:
all of the counts raised in [Nader and Camejo's] complaint are
grounded solidly in state law and thus do not raise a valid federal
question sufficient to invoke the district court's jurisdiction; the
defendants ha[ve] not met the unanimity requirement as [the Sec-
retary of State of Florida] ha[s] not consented to the removal and
she is a necessary and indispensable party to the case; and [Nader,
Camejo and the Reform Party of Florida] waived their rights to
remove the cause to federal court by invoking the jurisdiction of
the Florida appellate courts and by participating in evidentiary
hearings on the merits of the case.
18
The circuit court concluded its final evidentiary hearing and issued a
declaratory judgment finding that Nader and Camejo were not qualified un-
der Florida law to appear on the ballot.'9 "The court also permanently en-
joined the Secretary of State from certifying Nader and Camejo on Florida's
ballots, from instructing the county supervisors of elections to include their
13. Id. at 306.
14. Reform Party of Fla., 885 So. 2d at 306.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 306-07.
17. Id. at 307.
18. Id.
19. Reform Party of Fla., 885 So. 2d at 307-08.
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names on the ballot, and from mailing any ballots pending further order of'
the Supreme Court of Florida. 0
C. Right to Regulate Elections by State
The majority and concurring opinion recognized that "'[a]s a practical
matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair
and honest."' 2 ' The majority also recognized that the United States Supreme
Court has:
upheld generally applicable and even-handed restrictions that pro-
tect the integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself. The
State has the undoubted right to require candidates to make a pre-
liminary showing of substantial support in order to qualify for a
place on the ballot, because it is both wasteful and confusing to
encumber the ballot with the names of frivolous candidates.22
However, as further detailed herein, the majority's decision concludes
that the state regulation of election law requires the abdication of the inter-
pretation of these state statutes by the courts when a presidential election is
involved.23
II. THE MAJORITY'S DECISION IS OVERSHADOWED BY THE 2000 ELEC-
TION
The issue before the Supreme Court of Florida was whether the Reform
Party of Florida and its purported nominees, Nader and Camejo, qualified to
be placed on the general election ballot pursuant to section 103.021 (4)(a) of
the Florida Statutes."4 Although the majority recognized that there was no
question that Florida could "impose 'some burden' upon the access to the
20. Id. at 308.
21. Id. (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)); id. at 314 (quoting Burdick
v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) (citation omitted)).
22. Id. at 308 (citing Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 n.9 (1983)). The butter-
fly ballots used in Palm Beach County during the 2000 presidential election caused much
voter confusion. See, e.g., Rick Weiss, Canadian Study Calls Butterfly Ballot 'Confusing,'
WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 2000, at A22; Gary Kane, But More Marked Ballots for Gore, PALM
BEACH POST, Nov. 12, 2001, at 1AA.
23. See Reform Party of Fla., 885 So. 2d at 308, 314.
24. Id. at 311.
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ballot,"25 it found that such burden had to be viewed in light of the United
States Constitution.26
The majority of the Supreme Court of Florida reversed the declaratory
judgment and vacated the injunction.2 1 In doing so, it recognized: (i) indi-
viduals have a constitutional right to associate and advance political beliefs;
(ii) qualified voters have a constitutional right to cast votes effectively; (iii)
states have an interest in encouraging compromise and political stability; and
(iv) election regulation is required if they are to be fair, honest, and condu-
cive to the maintenance of order.28
The most disturbing aspect of the majority's decision is its intellectual
retreat from exercising traditional statutory analysis with respect to section
103.021(4)(a), justifying this retreat by relying on Bush v. Palm Beach
County Canvassing Board.29 In Bush v. Gore,3 ° the United States Supreme
Court reminded the litigants that "[t]he individual citizen has no federal con-
stitutional right to vote for electors for the President of the United States
unless and until the state legislature chooses a statewide election as the
means to implement its power to appoint members of the electoral college.'
The Court then unanimously vacated the Supreme Court of Florida's deci-
sion which had required the Secretary of State of Florida to allow votes cast
in the counties of Volusia, Palm Beach, Miami-Dade, and Broward, to be
included in the certified tabulated 2000 election totals.32
The Supreme Court of Florida's decision was based upon Article I, Sec-
tion 1 of the Florida Constitution,33 which expressly states in relevant part
"all political power is inherent in the people., 34 The Supreme Court of Flor-
ida reasoned that any election law or action by an election official could not
impose any "'unreasonable or unnecessary' restraints on the right of suf-
frage. 35 In vacating the decision, the United States Supreme Court relied
upon Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution 36 as the
25. Id. at 310 (quoting Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433).
26. Id. at 310-11 (citing Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 28-29 (1968)).
27. Id. at314.
28. Reform Party of Fla., 885 So. 2d at 308 (citations omitted).
29. 531 U.S. 70 (2000) [hereinafter Bush 1]; Reform Party of Fla., 885 So. 2d at 308-09.
30. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) [hereinafter Bush Il.
31. Id. at 104 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1).
32. Id. at 101,111.
33. Article I, Section 1 of the Florida Constitution provides: "All political power is in-
herent in the people. The enunciation herein of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or
impair others retained by the people." FLA. CO NST. art. 1, § 1.
34. Id.
35. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1236 (2000).
36. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
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authority to support its holding that the Supreme Court of Florida could not
construe any Florida Statute in connection with a presidential election which
would infringe upon the authority granted to state legislatures to choose the
manner of selecting that state's presidential electors.37 The Supreme Court
of Florida refused to undertake traditional statutory analysis for section
103.021(4)(a) because in doing so the majority feared it "could run afoul of
Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution."3 As the
majority reasoned, "although the judiciary has the power and authority to
construe statutes, it cannot construe statutes in a manner that would infringe
on the direct grant of authority to the Legislature through the United States
Constitution.,
39
The majority per curiam decision in Bush II made it unequivocally clear
that the case was not to be cited as precedent.40 Unfortunately, the same lan-
guage of limitation was not included in Bush IL4' The same political crucible
of the nation's closest presidential election which led to the outcome deter-
minative reasoning of Bush II also drove the decision in Bush 1.42 The case
of Reform Party of Florida was not the first time the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida confronted Article II,43 since November of 2000. It also confronted that
Article in its remand decision from Bush IL 44 In that decision, the court
noted that "[t]he 'intent of the voter' standard adopted by the Legislature was
the standard in place as of November 7, 2000,1 5 and the court would not
concede on remand from Bush II that to establish standards for the determi-
nation of a legal vote in accordance with the then-existing legislation would
37. See Bush 1, 531 U.S. at 76 (holding that a legislature may take action to disenfran-
chise a voter or group of voters in the Presidential election which, while unconstitutional
under the Florida Constitution, would be constitutional under the Federal Constitution.).
38. Reform Party of Fla., 885 So. 2d at 313.
39. Id at 312; cf Fla. Democratic Party v. Hood, 884 So. 2d 1148, 1149-51 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (considering whether or not Florida's executive branch violated section
120.54(4) of the Florida Statutes and Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the United States Con-
stitution by issuing an emergency rule restricting recounts of electronic voting machines one
business hour prior to the commencement of early voting in the general election); Petitioner's
Brief on the Merits at 7, Fla. Democratic Party v. Hood, 888 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 2004) (No.
SC04-2072). However, the Supreme Court of Florida refused to address this question by
declining to consider the petition for review of the emergency rule after "having determined
that it should decline to exercise jurisdiction." Fla. Democratic Party v. Hood, No. SC04-
2072, 2004 Fla. LEXIS 2043, at *1 (Fla. Nov.10, 2004).
40. See Bush II, 531 U.S. at 109. "Our consideration is limited to the present circum-
stances .... Id.
41. SeeBush I, 531 U.S. at 70.
42. Id.
43. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
44. See Gore v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 2000).
45. Id. at 526.
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have violated Article II of the Federal Constitution. 46 So, why did the Su-
preme Court of Florida refuse to establish standards for ballot access in the
Reform Party of Florida case when it had previously expressly reserved its
right to interpret state statutes consistent with its responsibility as a court and
Article 1I?
4
Certainly any review of the history and meaning of Article II prior to
Bush I would have comforted the Supreme Court of Florida in performing its
traditional role as a court in interpreting section 103.021 (4)(a) of the Florida
Statutes.4' As previously stated in an article co-authored by one of these
authors:
The United States Supreme Court's "direct grant of authority"
view contemplates that the states relinquished the power to select
presidential electors to the federal government at the Constitu-
tional Convention and then, in an act of charitable benevolence,
the federal government donated that power to the states. Under
such logic, the federal government can "direct[ly] grant" the au-
thority to select electors to a specific entity of the several states,
namely the legislature. However, Article II, Section 1, Clause 2,
rather than being a "direct grant" of authority, is a reservation of
power by the states. The text of the clause itself supports this
proposition. The Constitution establishes that "[e]ach State shall
appoint" presidential electors, textually recognizing that the
power to select presidential electors lies in the several states.
The text of title 3, section 5 of the United States Code sup-
ports this view. Apparently, when creating section 5, Congress
believed that the federal constitution contemplates a state legisla-
ture delegating issues of enforcement and interpretation to a co-
ordinate branch of government.
[U]nlike the federal government, the several states are in-
dependent sovereigns with all the inherent powers of common
46. Id. at 526. "[T]he per curiam decision in Bush v. Gore acknowledged that the Su-
preme Court of Florida had the 'power to assure uniformity."' Mitchell W. Berger & Candice
D. Tobin, Election 2000: The Law of Tied Presidential Elections, 26 NOVA. L. REv. 647, 846
(2002) (citing Bush II, 531 U.S. at 109); see also Gore, 773 So. 2d at 526.
47. See Reform Party of Fla. v. Black, 885 So. 2d 303, 313 (Fla. 2004).
48. FLA. STAT. § 103.021(4)(a) (2004).
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law sovereignty, absent those relinquished to the federal gov-
ernment. State constitutions are limitations on the inherent sov-
ereign power of states created by the people of that state.
... Those limitations operate when the Florida Legislature se-
lects the manner to appoint electors. Therefore, if a law of the
Florida Legislature operates in a manner that violates one of the
paramount rights of the people of the State of Florida, then the
legislature is subverting the sovereign limitations set forth by the
people of Florida....
Essentially, the federal constitution "takes state legislative bodies
as it finds them-subject to pre-existing control by the people of
each state, the ultimate masters of the state legislatures-and the
state constitutional limits that those people create. As a result,
the United States Supreme Court's expression that the Florida
Constitution may have "'circumscribe[d] the legislative power"'
provided by Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 rests on the faulty
premise that this clause gives the Florida Legislature power that
the people of Florida had not granted it.
49
Instead of performing a traditional statutory analysis and reviewing the
record in the Reform Party of Florida case, the majority reasoned that "the
determination of whether [a] candidate qualifies under section 103.021 (4)(a)
by claiming to be a 'minor political party that is affiliated with a national
party holding a national convention to nominate candidates for President and
Vice President' involves a legal determination., 50 This reasoning is unsup-
ported by citation, but appears to stem from the court's Article II concerns.5
Against this backdrop, the majority concluded that "we have been unable to
ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statutory terms to have a
strict or broad meaning. In the absence of more specific statutory criteria or
49. Berger & Tobin, supra note 46, at 689-92 (citations omitted). Title 3, section 5 of
the United States Code further provides:
If any State shall have provided, by laws enacted prior to the day fixed for the ap-
pointment of the electors, for its final determination of any controversy or contest con-
cerning the appointment of all or any of the electors of such State, by judicial or other
methods or procedures, and such determination shall have been ... made at least six
days prior to said time of meeting of the electors, shall be conclusive, and shall govern
in the counting of the electoral votes as provided in the Constitution, and as hereinafter
regulated, so far as the ascertainment of the electors appointed by such a State is con-
cerned.
Id. at 690 (quoting 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2000)) (emphasis added).
50. Reform Party of Fla., 885 So. 2d at 311.
51. See id. at 312.
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guidance from the Legislature we are unable to conclude that a statutory vio-
lation occurred.,
52
A. The Concurrence of Justice Lewis
While Justice Lewis concurs in the result, he undertakes a traditional
statutory analysis performed by appellate courts on appeal. 3 Expressly dis-
agreeing with the majority's analysis, Justice Lewis held:
I cannot at all agree with the analysis and reasoning of the major-
ity. The right to vote is a fundamental and essential part of our
constitutional democracy and is subject to reasonable regulation.
The United States Supreme Court made this apparent in Burdick v.
Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 ... (1992), when it stated:
It is beyond cavil that voting is of the most fundamental sig-
nificance under our constitutional structure. It does not follow,
however, that the right to vote in any manner and the right to as-
sociate for political purposes through the ballot are absolute.
The Constitution provides that States may prescribe "[t]he
Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators
and Representatives, " Art, L § 4, cl. 1, and the Court therefore
has recognized that States retain the power to regulate their
own elections. Common sense, as well as constitutional law,
compels the conclusion that government must play an active
role in structuring elections; as a practical matter, there must be
a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and
honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accom-
pany the democratic processes.
5 4
Justice Lewis rejected Article II as being a limitation on the state retain-
ing the power, including through its judicial branch "to regulate their own
elections., 55 As Justice Lewis stated:
Although minor political parties most certainly do have a right to
be on the ballot, courts have consistently held that this right is not
absolute and without restrictions .... Our system is legislatively
designed so that minor parties affiliated with a national party hold-
ing a national convention, see § 103.021(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2003),
52. Id. at 314.
53. See id.
54. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted in original).
55. Reform Party of Fla., 885 So. 2d at 314 (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428,
433 (1992)).
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are treated differently than minor parties that are not affiliated with
a national party holding a national convention, see §
103.021(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2003). To construe subsection (4)(a) as
the majority does today is nothing less than this Court basically
rewriting the statute and using a judicial eraser to strip section
(4)(a) of the same dignity this Court has afforded the petition re-
quirement in subsection (4)(b) .... [Justice Lewis then declares
that] [t]here is no administrative remedy afforded under these cir-
cumstances and, therefore, it necessarily falls on the shoulders of
the judiciary to determine the rights of the parties in this dispute by
interpreting and applying the statute.56
Justice Lewis proceeded to analyze the language in the statute through
traditional means and concluded that under a traditional statutory analysis
employed by courts and reviewing courts, "[i]n my view, the determinations
made by the trial court are eminently correct based on the evidence and ar-
guments presented.,
57
B. Supreme Court of Florida Fails to Construe the Florida Statute58
After considering the evidence presented, the trial court found that
Nader and Camejo as candidates of the Reform Party of Florida, were not
56. Id. at 315-16 (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 317. In concluding that the trial court was correct in finding that the Reform
Party was not a national party and that it did not hold a national convention, Justice Lewis
refers to the dictionary as required by prior precedent and says: "A simplistic approach by
reference to textual material demonstrates that Black's Law Dictionary defines 'national' as
'[o]f or relating to a nation' and 'nationwide in scope."' Id. at 318. The majority dismisses
definitions set forth in various dictionaries as providing little guidance. Id. at 312.
58. Interestingly, the Florida Secretary of State's position was that her fumction was
"purely ministerial" and therefore she had "no basis to look behind the certificate [submitted
by Nader and Camejo] to determine [whether] the party meets the statutory criteria." Reform
Party of Fla., 885 So. 2d at 311. However, if the Secretary's function is purely ministerial,
then how does the Secretary determine whether a petition was signed by one percent of the
registered voters of Florida under section 103.021(4)(b) of the Florida Statutes? The Secre-
tary's position would effectively eliminate the need for section 103.021 (4)(b), Florida Stat-
utes, because all potential presidential candidates would only need to submit a certificate
under section 103.021 (4)(a). See the dissenting opinion of Justice Anstead approving the trial
court's reasoning that:
in enacting section 103.021(4)(a), Florida Statutes, the Legislature surely did not intend the
standards for national party, minor party, and national nominating convention to be meaning-
less. As the trial court noted, "it doesn't seem ... to make any sense that the Legislature
would have a provision in the law that says you can get on the ballot as a minor party by get-
ting a ... great number of signatures, and then have another way that's basically no require-
ments."
Id. at 321 (Anstead, J., dissenting).
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legally qualified pursuant to section 103.021(4)(a), Florida Statutes, to ap-
pear on the ballot because: 1) Reform Party USA was not a "national party;"
and 2) Nader and Camejo were not nominated in a "national convention., 59
The Supreme Court of Florida summarized its position indicating that
section 103.021(4)(a) of the Florida Statutes did not define the terms "na-
tional party" or "national convention," concluding therefore that "the Reform
Party of Florida was not on notice that these terms were to be interpreted in
accordance with any specific criteria and certainly not the criteria utilized by
the trial court., 60 Further, "[i]n the absence of more specific statutory criteria
or guidance from the Legislature [they were] unable to conclude that a statu-
tory violation occurred.",6' The majority then stated that it "urge[s] the Leg-
islature to revisit this important issue at its earliest opportunity.
62
In making its decision, the majority indicated that it was being mindful
of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution providing indi-
viduals the right to associate for the advancement of political beliefs as well
as the state legislature's exclusive power to determine how the electors of
Florida are chosen, citing to Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the United
States Constitution.63 The majority indicated that "although the judiciary has
the power and authority to construe statutes, it cannot construe statutes in a
manner that would infringe on the direct grant of authority to the Legislature
through the United States Constitution. '64 However, as previously noted,
this is impossible since the federal government, which was not yet formed in
1789, could not give a direct grant of authority to state legislatures.65 In
1789, it was the state legislatures at the Constitutional Convention, who re-
served the power to appoint state electors.66 This is critical because if states
59. Id. at 305.
60. Id. at 314.
61. Id.
62. Reform Party of Fla., 885 So. 2d at 314.
63. Id. at 311-12. Article II provides, "[e]ach State shall appoint, in such Manner as the
Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators
and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress." U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 1, cl. 2.
64. Reform Party of Fla., 885 So. 2d at 312 (emphasis added).
65. See supra Part II.
66. See THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 241 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright
ed., 1961) (stating "the State governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty
which they before had, and which were not, by that act, exclusively delegated to the United
States") (emphasis added); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 285 (James Madison) (Benja-
min Fletcher Wright ed., 1961) ("[T]he proposed government cannot be deemed a national
one; since its jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several
States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects"); see also THE
FEDERALIST No. 40, at 290 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961) ("[T]he
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reserved this power, they also generally reserved for the state's statutes to be
interpreted in normal course by its courts.
The majority focused on the term "national party" and essentially disre-
garded the other statutory requirement for the candidates to have been nomi-
nated by a national party "holding a national convention."67 More specifi-
cally, the majority indicated that section 103.021(4)(a) of the Florida Stat-
utes does not define "national party. 68 It reviewed the dictionary, noting the
term was not defined therein,69 then went on to analyze the term "national
party" by comparing the definitions in other states' statutes, concluding that
"there is no consensus on what constitutes a national party., 70 The majority
went on to discuss an advisory opinion issued by the Federal Election Com-
mission (FEC) which discussed criteria it used in determining whether a po-
litical party has "demonstrated sufficient activity on a national level to attain
national committee status.",71 Such criteria included: "(1) the party's nomi-
nation of candidates for various Federal offices in numerous states; (2) the
party's engagement in certain activities on an ongoing basis[;]" and "(3) the
party's publicization of issues of importance to the party and its adherents
throughout the nation. 7 2 However, despite evidence that the Reform Party
USA "lost its status as a national party because it no longer" had support,
"almost eliminated fundraising," and only had candidates for federal office
(other than President) in two other states, the court indicated that it could not
conclude that the Florida Legislature intended to incorporate the FEC's stan-
dards in connection with the term "national party" included in the Florida
Statute, because the "FEC's interest relates to the integrity of campaign fund-
raising access, whereas the state's interest lies in protecting the integrity of
the ballot."73
The court barely mentioned the dispute as to whether Nader and
Camejo were nominated in a "national convention" by their purported na-
States, in all unenumerated cases, are left in the enjoyment of their sovereign and independent
jurisdiction").
67. Reform Party of Fla., 885 So. 2d at 310.
68. Id. at 312.
69. Id. However, the term "party" has been defined as "a group of persons with common
political opinions and purposes organized for gaining political influence and governmental
control and for directing government policy." RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY
1416 (2d ed. 1993). The adjective "national" has been defined as "of, pertaining to, or main-
tained by a nation as an organized whole or independent political unit." Id. at 1279. Although
each word is defined separately, the majority did not expend much effort to interpret the
words using a common sense approach.
70. Reform Party ofFla., 885 So. 2d at 312-13.
71. Id. at 313.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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tional party and noted that "some type of meeting occurred., 74 As clearly
indicated in section 103.021(4) of the Florida Statutes, unless a Presidential
or Vice-Presidential candidate is part of a minor party affiliated with a na-
tional party holding a national convention, such candidate must obtain a peti-
tion containing the signatures of one percent of Florida's registered voters in
order to appear on the general election ballot.75 The majority held that gath-
ering signatures involved a pure question of objectively verifiable fact, yet
indicated that the determination of whether a candidate qualifies under sec-
tion 103.021 (4)(a) of the Florida Statutes involved a legal determination.76
However, it is apparent that party affiliation and whether a "national
convention" was held are factual determinations,7 which is precisely why
the trial court considered evidence in making its finding that Nader and
Camejo did not qualify under Florida law to appear on the general election
ballot.78 Even if the term "national party" were ambiguous, as aptly stated by
Justice Lewis in his concurring opinion, "[t]he Judiciary must ... give life to
the legislative words.,
79
Our system is legislatively designed so that minor parties affiliated
with a national party holding a national convention, see §
103.021(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2003), are treated differently than minor
parties that are not affiliated with a national party holding a na-
tional convention, see § 103.021(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2003). To con-
strue subsection (4)(a) as the majority does today is nothing less
than this Court basically rewriting the statute and using a judicial
74. Id. at 314. The "national convention" was an endorsement of Nader and Camejo via
a telephone conference call which did not follow the Reform Party's own definition of "na-
tional convention." Reform Party of Fla., 885 So. 2d at 305. According to Black's Law Dic-
tionary, "convention" is defined as "[a]n assembly or meeting of members belonging to an
organization or having a common objective," the term "national" as "[o]f or relating to a na-
tion" or "nationwide in scope" and the term "assembly" as "[a] group of persons organized
and united for some common purpose." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 124, 355 1050 (8th ed.
2004). It is hard to conclude a plain reading of the words "national convention" would be
interpreted to include a conference call, let alone a call of the type which the record indicates
occurred in this case. Reform Party of Florida, 885 So. 2d at 305.
75. FLA. STAT. § 103.021(4) (2004).
76. Reform Party of Fla., 885 So. 2d at 311; see also FLA. STAT. § 103.021(4)(a).
77. See id. at 319 (Lewis, J., concurring). In his concurrence, Justice Lewis noted that
"[n]o matter what definition one may establish as to 'national' under this statute, there would
be a factual question regarding whether the entity or group satisfies that definition, which the
majority summarily rejects." Id. (Lewis, J., concurring).
78. See id. at 305.
79. Id. at 317-18 (Lewis, J., concurring).
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eraser to strip section (4)(a) of the same dignity as this Court has
afforded the petition requirement in subsection (4)(b). s°
In sum, despite the fact that the majority acknowledged that there was a
"lengthy evidentiary hearing, that included receipt of documentary evidence
and arguments from the parties,"8' the majority decision failed to give defer-
ence to the findings of fact made by the trial court. Justice Lewis, in his
concurrence, noted that "[t]he majority, in my view, fails to even consider
that there is a factual component as to whether one satisfies the legal criteria
of a statute. 83
C. Other Concerns - Is the Florida Statute Void for Vagueness?
If the majority of the Supreme Court of Florida and the Secretary of
State are correct that the Reform Party of Florida was not on notice of the
interpretation of the terms "national party" and "national convention," is the
statute void for vagueness?
The United States Supreme Court has held that with respect to whether
a statute is void for vagueness,
generally .. .decisions of the court upholding statutes as suffi-
ciently certain, rested upon the conclusion that they employed
words or phrases having a technical or other special meaning, well
enough known to enable those within their reach to correctly apply
them ... or a well-settled common law meaning, notwithstanding
an element of degree in the definition as to which estimates might
differ . . . or, as broadly stated by Mr. Chief Justice White ...
"that, for reasons found to result either from the text of the statutes
involved or the subjects with which they dealt, a standard of some
sort was afforded.,
84
Similarly, under Florida law, a statute "will not be declared vague
unless the statute fails to give persons of ordinary intelligence fair notice of
what constitutes the forbidden conduct and which, because of imprecision,
may invite arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement., 85  In analyzing
80. Reform Party of Fla., 885 So. 2d at 315 (Lewis, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 310.
82. Id. at 317 (Lewis, J., concurring).
83. Id. (Lewis, J., concurring).
84. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1926) (citations omitted).
85. State v. Delgrasso, 653 So. 2d 459, 462 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995); see also Glu-
hareff v. State, 888 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (finding statute was "sufficiently
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whether a statute is void for vagueness courts first determine whether the
statute fairly gives notice to those it seeks to bind of its strictures.86 Second,
courts determine whether the statute is precise enough as to not invite the
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement thereof.87 If the statute provides
both fair notice and is sufficiently precise, it will be upheld.88 However, if
either determination is negative, the statute will be found void for vague-
ness.
89
The majority concluded "we are left with a statute that does not have its
critical terms defined or standards set for ascertaining compliance with the
statute. We thus urge the Legislature to revisit this important issue at its ear-
liest opportunity." 90 However, Justice Lewis' concurrence indicates that the
statute was capable of interpretation, noting:
[t]he trial court, without the benefit of a specific definition of
"national," probed the parameters of what a "national party" hold-
ing a "national convention" really was intended to and actually en-
compassed.
... [T]he trial judge had not only competent and substantial evi-
dence to support his findings but also the only evidence presented
supported the conclusion that this is not a "national party" within
the purview of the controverted statute. 91
Justice Lewis further noted:
[n]otwithstanding that there may be various inflections of what a
word may mean, an overly technical approach would result in no
word ever having an acceptable or legally sufficient definite mean-
specific to give notice and adequate warning to persons of common intelligence of the conduct
that is proscribed" despite the statute's failure to define the term "under the influence").
86. See Delgrasso, 653 So. 2d at 462-63.
87. See id. at 462.
88. See, e.g., United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92-93 (1975) (upholding a statute
prohibiting the mailing of concealable firearms because it established a "reasonably ascertain-
able standard of conduct" and because it provided notice to the citizens as to what actions are
proscribed by the statute).
89. See id.
90. Reform Party of Fla. v. Black, 885 So. 2d 303, 314 (Fla. 2004).
91. Id. at 317 (Lewis, J., concurring).
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ing or understanding. A word does not necessarily need to be de-
fined by precise elements to have a common understanding.92
Yet Justice Lewis concurred in the result finding that "it may be properly
advanced that the appellants were not afforded adequate notice as to what
constituted a 'national party"' under the statute, thereby implicating Nader
and Camejo's due process rights.93
If the majority and Justice Lewis found that the Florida Statute was not
sufficiently clear to put Nader and Camejo on notice with respect to whether
they could qualify to be placed on the ballot, under the standards established
by the United States Supreme Court, the statute should have been deemed
void under the void for vagueness doctrine as being violative of Nader and
Camejo's due process rights.94 Such a finding would have produced a simi-
lar result-Nader and Camejo would have been placed on the ballot.95 How-
ever, both the majority and the concurrence failed to recognize the statute as
void based upon the rationale that the term "national party" was not defined
in the statute and therefore did not provide notice to Nader and Camejo on
how such term would be interpreted and applied to them.9 6 This logic is
clearly flawed as the trial court made specific findings on the issue based
upon the evidence presented, which the majority failed to recognize and
which Justice Lewis inexplicably found to be correct, yet concurred in the
result reached by the majority.97
III. CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, the Court failed to adjudicate the rights of the parties
through interpretation and application of the appropriate statute. Justice An-
stead, in his dissent, echoes Justice Lewis stating:
[a]s the trial court noted, "it doesn't seem ... to make any sense
that the Legislature would have a provision in the law that says
you can get on the ballot as a minor party by getting a ... great
92. Id. at 319 (Lewis, J., concurring).
93. Id.
94. See Powell, 423 U.S. at 92.
95. See id.
96. See Reform Party of Fla. v. Black, 885 So. 2d 303, 314-19 (Fla. 2004) (Lewis, J.,
concurring).
97. See id.
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number of signatures, and then have another way that's basically
no requirements."
98
This is precisely the result that the Supreme Court of Florida has created by
avoiding its responsibility to act as an appellate court. However, the co-
authors of this Section of this article submit that the constitutional amend-
ment proposed by Mr. Anderson in Section III of this article, would prevent
the courts from being confronted with making decisions that fail to apply the
law.
98. Id. at 321 (Anstead, C.J., dissenting).
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SECTION III: A REVIEW OF FLORIDA'S BALLOT ACCESS
LAW IN LIGHT OF REFORM PARTY OF FLORIDA v. BLACK
JOHN ANDERSON
In Reform Party of Florida v. Black, the Supreme Court of Florida up-
held the decision of the Secretary of State, Glenda Hood, to place the names
of Ralph Nader and Peter Camejo on the 2004 Florida presidential ballot as
candidates of the Reform Party of the United States of America.99 This ac-
tion reversed the decision of the Circuit Court for the Second Judicial Circuit
of Florida, which had ordered the removal of their names from the ballot."'°
The circuit court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, who argued that Nader and
Camejo were spurious candidates of a "minor party" who were not actually
affiliated with a national party."°1 National affiliation of candidates on Flor-
ida ballots is required by section 103.021(4)(a) of the Florida Statutes. °2
The gravamen of the complaint, which numbered registered Democrats and
Republicans, as well as Florida residents, was that the above-cited section of
the Florida Statutes was inapplicable because the Reform Party of Florida
had no actual affiliation with the national party.
°3
In its ruling, the lower court further found that despite its name, the Re-
form Party USA was not a "national party," and therefore the Reform Party
of Florida could not be affiliated with a non-existent entity. °4 Among its
other findings was one in which the circuit court concluded that Nader and
Camejo were not nominees of a "national convention" because they were
nominated via a conference call which violated the Reform Party USA's own
prescribed procedures.'05
In its opinion, the Supreme Court of Florida also cited three United
States Supreme Court decisions involving ballot access, one of which, Storer
v. Brown,"6 refers to "the substantial state interest in encouraging compro-
mise and political stability, in attempting to ensure that the election winner
99. 885 So. 2d 303, 304 (Fla. 2004).
100. Id. at 304-05.
101. Id. at 305; see generally FLA. STAT. § 103.021(4)(a) (2004).
102. § 103.021(4)(a).
103. Reform Party of Fla., 885 So. 2d at 305. One of the Florida residents was registered
as Independent and one was a registered member of the Reform Party of Florida. Id. at 304.
104. See id. at 305.
105. Id. It should be of more than passing interest that the defendants in this litigation
sought to remove the case to federal court because a federal question was involved but were
rebuffed by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida on the grounds
that all of the counts in the plaintiffs' complaint were firmly anchored in state law. Id. at 307.
106. 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
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will represent a majority of the community and in providing the electorate
with an understandable ballot.' 0
7
In its per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court of Florida further cites
Storer v. Brown as holding: "'[A]s a practical matter, there must be a sub-
stantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some
sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic proc-
esses."
' 108
The Supreme Court of Florida then stated:
Thus, the United States Supreme Court has "upheld generally ap-
plicable and evenhanded restrictions that protect the integrity and
reliability of the electoral process itself. The State has the un-
doubted right to require candidates to make a preliminary showing
of substantial support in order to qualify for a place on the ballot,
because it is both wasteful and confusing to encumber the ballot
with the names of frivolous candidates."' 0 9
The principal point to be made here, in analyzing the proper role for the
judicial branch of state government in deciding questions involving presiden-
tial ballot access, is that a unique national interest is involved. After all, the
presidential office is completely unlike the thousands of elected state and
federal offices that are involved in the electoral process. It is therefore the
singular nature of those offices-the President and the Vice-President-that
overshadows any effort at the state level to design the ballot and to establish
fixed rules that focus on efforts by individuals to gain access to the ballots
that are prepared quadrennially to give the American voter the right to
choose their top two national leaders.
107. Id. at 729 (citing Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968)); Reform Party of Fla.,
885 So. 2d at 308.
108. Reform Party of Fla., 885 So. 2d at 308 (quoting Storer, 415 U.S. at 730).
109. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788-89 n.9 (1983) (citations
omitted) [hereinafter Anderson I1]). It should be noted at this point that Anderson H was also
cited in another per curiam opinion, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 112 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring). This was unquestionably the most bitterly contentious opinion dealing with the
electoral process in the entire history of the United States Supreme Court. See generally Bush
v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). Chief Justice Rehnquist, with whom Justices Scalia and Thomas
joined in concurring, stated in that case:
Likewise, in Anderson v. Celebrezze, we said: "[I]n the context of a Presidential
election, state-imposed restrictions implicate a uniquely important national interest.
For the President and the Vice President of the United States are the only elected
officials who represent all the voters in the Nation."
Id at 112 (citation omitted).
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I. INTRODUCTORY NOTE
The co-author of this article writes from the perspective of one who for-
mally abandoned our venerable two-party system a quarter of a century ago.
I did so by declaring myself an Independent candidate for our nation's high-
est office. I was immediately confronted with the multiple problems of bal-
lot access, and this resulted in multiple lawsuits in federal and state courts
with one, the eponymous Anderson v. Celebrezze," ° reaching the United
States Supreme Court.' In 1980, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio ruled correctly in allowing me to gain access to the
Ohio ballot, and validating my claim that I truly was a national candidate
having achieved ballot access in all states." l2 For those interested in a de-
tailed account of my entire adventure I refer you to Jumping Through 51
Hoops: John Anderson's Struggle for Ballot Access and Its Effect on the
Rights of Independent and Third Party Candidates."3
My contribution to this article is not, as should become apparent to the
reader, a reprise of that effort. Nevertheless, a quarter of a century after that
experience, my deeply held feeling is that despite a plethora of changes in
the laws relating to the electoral process, insufficient progress has been
made. Progress is essential to right the wrongs of a system so firmly held
within the implacable grasp of a two-party duopoly, that it causes independ-
ents and minor parties to become victims of a "partisan lockup" (to use the
phrase of two prominent critics of many features of our current electoral
structure)." 4
At the very outset of my contribution to this commentary on Florida's
ballot access law, as it was construed in the case of Reform Party of Florida
v. Black, I wish to associate myself strongly with the views of the distin-
guished political scientist, Morris P. Fiorina, in his celebrated article, The
Decline of Collective Responsibility in American Politics."5 In the article,
Fiorina pays respect to the Framers, who emphasized in the structured ar-
110. 664 F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter Anderson 1].
111. Anderson 11, 460 U.S. at 780.
112. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 499 F. Supp. 121 (D. Ohio 1980), rev'd, 664 F.2d 554 (6th
Cir. 1981), rev'd, 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
113. See Rebbecca Landis, Jumping Through 51 Hoops: John Anderson's Struggle for
Ballot Access and Its Effect on the Rights of Independent and Third Party Candidates (1985)
(unpublished thesis, University of Texas) (on file with author).
114. Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of
the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REv. 643 (1998); see generally Reform Party of Fla. v.
Black, 885 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 2004).
115. Morris P. Fiorina, The Decline of Collective Responsibility in American Politics, 109
DAEDALUS 25 (1980).
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rangements they conceived and embodied in our Constitution, that govern-
ment should be workable but not all powerful. 16 This resulted in a federal
system that is deeply concerned about the government's power, hemmed in
by checks and balances, all based on the Framer's prior experiences.' 17 Be-
cause of this concern, they were predisposed to a system that would maintain
a status quo. 1 8 But writing almost 200 years later, in 1980, Fiorina felt that
it now behooves us to "worry about our ability to make government workfor
us. The problem is that we are gradually losing that ability, and a principal
reason for this loss is the steady erosion of responsibility in American poli-
tics. '
II. THE Two PARTY SYSTEM'S EFFECT ON THE ELECTORAL PROCESS
The subsequent repudiation by the United States Supreme Court of the
Supreme Court of Florida's assertion of the plenary nature of the right of the
individual voter to vote for President and Vice-President of the United States
occurred in its per curiam opinion in Bush i.'20 The Court vacated the Su-
preme Court of Florida's order, relying heavily on McPherson v. Blacker.12 1
In McPherson, the Court, more than a.century before, stated:
[Art. 1I, § 1, cl. 2] does not read that the people or the citizens shall
appoint, but that "each State shall"; and if the words "in such man-
ner as the legislature thereof may direct," had been omitted, it
would seem that the legislative power of appointment could not
have been successfully questioned in the absence of any provision
in the state constitution in that regard. Hence the insertion of those
words, while operating as a limitation upon the State in respect of
any attempt to circumscribe the legislative power, cannot be held
to operate as a limitation on that power itself.122
Thus, the United States Supreme Court, at least as it is presently com-
posed, is firmly in lockstep with a body of precedent dating back more than a
century which holds that the state legislature retains the power to determine
the election to the Presidency of the United States, not the people. 23 Indeed,
116. Id. at25.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000) [hereinafter Bush 1].
121. Id. at 76, 78 (citing McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 25 (1892)).
122. McPherson, 146 U.S. at 25.
123. See Bush 1, 531 U.S. at 76-78.
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the Court in Bush I made it abundantly clear that a principal reason for the
remand was its dubiety regarding the portion of the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida's opinion that stated: "[b]ecause the right to vote is the pre-eminent right
in the Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitution" it should circum-
scribe any laws governing the electoral process.1"' The Supreme Court of
Florida further stated that "election laws are intended to facilitate the right of
suffrage"'25 and therefore, laws that regulate the electoral process "are valid
only if they impose no 'unreasonable or unnecessary' restraints on the right
of suffrage." '126 The Supreme Court of Florida then cited Treiman v. Malm-
quist 127 which stated:
the declaration of rights expressly states that "all political power
is inherent in the people." The right of the people to select their
own officers is their sovereign right, and the rule is against impos-
ing unnecessary and unreasonable disqualifications to run.... Un-
reasonable or unnecessary restraints on the elective process are
prohibited.1
28
The Supreme Court of Florida then stated:
[b]ecause election laws are intended to facilitate the right of suf-
frage, such laws must be liberally construed in favor of the citi-
zens' right to vote:
Generally, the courts, in construing statutes relating to elections,
hold that the same should receive a liberal construction in favor
of the citizen whose right to vote they tend to restrict and in so
doing to prevent disfranchisement of legal voters and the inten-
tion of the voters should prevail when counting ballots.... It is
the intention of the law to obtain an honest expression of the
will or desire of the voter. 
129
Courts must not lose sight of the fundamental purpose of election
laws: [t]he laws are intended to facilitate and safeguard the right of
each voter to express his or her will in the context of our represen-
124. See id. at 75-78; Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220,
1239 (Fla. 2000).
125. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1237.
126. Id. at 1236.
127. 342 So. 2d 972 (Fla. 1977).
128. Id. at 975 (citations omitted).
129. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1237 (quoting State ex. rel. Carpenter v. Barber, 198 So. 49
(Fla. 1940)).
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tative democracy. Technical statutory requirements must not be
exalted over the substance of this right.'
30
The Court's opinion in Bush J13 asserting the potential federal interest,
laid the foundation for Bush JJ,132 which decided the election of 2000.133 This
was only accomplished by overriding the textual commitment of the Florida
State Constitution, which gives primacy to the wish and intent of the individ-
ual voter in deciding any presidential election contest. 134 The Court accom-
plished this by an invocation of Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the United
States Constitution, as well as a failure to comply with title 3, section 5 of the
United States Code.135 A further ground, of course, was the Court's reliance
on the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. 136
Bush H is perhaps best remembered for its sweeping assertion that
"[t]he individual citizen has no federal constitutional right to vote for electors
for the President of the United States unless and until the state legislature
chooses a statewide election as the means to implement its power to appoint
members of the electoral college,"'137 citing then to the United States Consti-
tution, Article II, Section 1.138 The Court continued, citing McPherson v.
Blacker,139 as its authority for the additional conclusion that "the state legis-
lature's power to select the manner for appointing electors is plenary; it may,
if it so chooses, select the electors itself."'4 ° Although the Court acknowl-
edged that current practice has seen citizens rather than, as was the practice
for many years, state legislatures voting for electors, it is not the constitu-
tional right of voters to do so, and the primacy of the state legislatures'
power could be asserted at any time and in any presidential election.'
41
We turn now to the relevance of these judicial precedents arising out of
the 2000 presidential election, to the controversy which arose in the 2004
election over ballot access for a candidate for the presidency, Ralph Nader,
which led to the decision of the Supreme Court of Florida in Reform Party of
130. Id. (footnotes omitted).
131. 531 U.S. 70 (2000).
132. 531 U.S. 98 (2000); see also Bush I, 531 U.S. 70 (2000).
133. The Presidential Election Is Finally Done, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2000, at C 15, 2000
WL 29921494.
134. See FLA. CONST. art VI, § 1.
135. U.S. CONST. art I1, § 1, cl. 2; 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2000); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104,
110(2000).
136. U.S. CoNsT. art XIV, § 1; Bush II, 531 U.S. at 104-05.
137. Bush If, 531 U.S. at 104.
138. Id.; U.S. CONST. art 1I, § 1, cl. 3.
139. 146 U.S. 1 (1892).
140. Bush 11, 531 U.S. at 104 (citing McPherson, 146 U.S. at 33).
141. Id. (citing McPherson, 146 U.S. at 35).
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Florida v. Black, on September 17, 2004.142 The court had to interpret a stat-
ute allowing a non-major party candidate to gain ballot access by becoming
the candidate of a minor party, affiliated with a national party, holding a na-
tional convention to nominate candidates for President and Vice President. 43
Some of the 1999 revisions to the Florida ballot access law provided for fil-
ing a list of the required number of persons to serve as electors. 44
The ensuing litigation over the Nader candidacy and its choice of this
route to ballot access, rather than use of a petitioning process, yielded a deci-
sion in Nader's favor. a14  However, Justice Lewis, concurring in the result
only, disagreed sharply with both the "analysis and reasoning of the major-
ity.' '146 He specifically lamented at great length the statute's failure to define
what constitutes a "national party."'4 7 And although he does not dwell upon
what can legitimately constitute a national nominating convention,1 48 espe-
cially in the age of the internet, where so much of business and commerce is
electronically conducted, it would perhaps be a daunting task to determine
whether or not an appropriate definition of a political convention would even
be achievable. I mention this because the plaintiffs in the Reform Party of
Florida made much of the nomination being the product of a telephone
call. 149
Perhaps, as Justice Lewis correctly observed in his concurrence, the
question of what constitutes a party was itself difficult enough. 5 ° However,
it is the anterior question, namely, the difficulties that surround the efforts of
parties (other than the two major parties) constituting a duopoly of power to
gain entrance to the political marketplace, which is the precise task that will
be undertaken and explored in this portion of the commentary on the Su-
preme Court of Florida's decision. This necessarily involves a discussion of
the political rights of independent and third party members who would seek
to challenge the present hierarchy of the two party system. This requires at
least a brief recitation of prior history and how this duopoly has flourished
under the United States Constitution over more than the last century and a
half.
142. 885 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 2004).
143. Id. at 305.
144. FLA. STAT. § 103.021(4)(a) (1999).
145. Reform Party of Fla., 885 So. 2d at 314. The petitioning process is allowable under
Florida law. Id. at 320 (Anstead, J., dissenting); see also FLA. STAT. § 103.021(4)(b) (2004).
146. Reform Party of Fla., 885 So. 2d at 314 (Lewis, J., concurring).
147. Id. at 316 (Lewis, J., concurring); see also FLA. STAT. § 103.021(4)(a) (2004).
148. See Reform Party of Fla., 885 So. 2d at 319.
149. Id. at 305.
150. See id. at 316 (Lewis, J., concurring).
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I firmly believe that a multi-party system would be beneficial to the
health of our democracy in general. Some of the reasons why the health of
our democracy can be questioned appeared in an article by Robert A. Pastor
who cited the following facts:
Registration and Identification of Voters. The United States
registers about 55 percent of its eligible voters, as compared with
more than 95 percent in Canada and Mexico. To ensure the accu-
racy of its list, Mexico conducted 36 audits between 1994 and
2000. In contrast, the United States has thousands of separate lists,
many of which are wildly inaccurate. Provisional ballots were
needed only because the lists are so bad. Under HAVA, all states
by 2006 must create computer-based, interactive statewide lists-a
major step forward that will work only if everyone agrees not to
move out of state. That is why most democracies, including most
of Europe, have nationwide lists and ask voters to identify them-
selves. Oddly, few U.S. states require proof of citizenship-which
is, after all, what the election is supposed to be about. If ID cards
threaten democracy, why does almost every democracy except us
require them, and why are their elections conducted better than
ours?151
Curtis Gans of the Center for the Study of the American Electorate has faith-
filly followed the rise and fall of participation by the American electorate in
presidential years over several decades.5 2 Other writers on the subject, like
Alexander Keyssar in The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democ-
racy in the United States, amply document the fact that despite the 15th,
19th, 23rd, 24th, and 26th Amendments to the United States Constitution, the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the 1982 amendments thereto, the National
Voter Registration Act of 1993 (often referred to as the "motor voter" law),
and last but far from least, in terms of its implications for electronic voting,
the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) 53 have not improved voter
participation. 5 4 HAVA is the last major federal legislation to deal with the
electoral process and was a response to some, but certainly not all, of the
151. Robert A. Pastor, America Observed Why Foreign Election Observers Would Rate
the United States Near the Bottom, AM. PROSPECT, Jan. 2005, at A2.
152. COUNCIL FOR EXCELLENCE IN GOVERNMENT, A MATTER OF TRUST: AMERICANS AND
THEIR GOVERNMENT: 1958-2004 47 (2004), at http://www.excelgov.org/usermedia/images/
uploads/PDFs/AMOT.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2005) [hereinafter A MATTER OF TRUST].
153. Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002) (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15301).
154. See generally ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY
OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES (2000).
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difficulties that arose in the bitter contest over the results of the 2000 elec-
tion. It should be noted at this point that Piven and Cloward link a decline in
voter participation to one of the several so-called realigning elections in our
history. 55 In this case, it was the election of McKinley in 1896 which saw
not only the defeat of his Democratic opponent, Williams Jennings Bryan,
but the emergence of the structured two-party system that has dominated our
presidential elections ever since.
15 6
The difficulty confronting the Supreme Court of Florida in Reform
Party of Florida was definitional. 5 7 What did the Florida Legislature mean
by such phrases as "national party" and "national convention?"'' 58 Justice
Lewis, quite properly, did not want to rely on the Federal Election Commis-
sion (FEC) (the regulatory body for campaign finance laws affecting presi-
dential campaigns) as the ultimate arbiter of when a party is qualified to put
its candidate before the voters.'59 This difficulty was highlighted by Justice
Lewis's comparison of the states of Hawaii and Iowa. 16  In the former, an
existing party in one other state entitled a minor party to ballot access in
presidential contests.' 6' However, in Iowa, the party must be recognized as
such "in at least twenty-five other states."'6 2 Despite Mr. Nader's success in
winning a place on the Florida ballot in 2004, the concurring opinion warned
that the imprecise language of the statute should constitute a clear warning to
future candidates that they are in danger of being denied the right to make
their case to the voters in a run for the presidency. 63
Florida's perceived dilemma about candidates wishing to run outside
the two-party system is a national problem, not just a state or local problem.
Since at least Anderson v. Celebrezze, 64 the Court has made it perfectly clear
that presidential elections involve a contest for the one office among thou-
sands of elected offices in our democracy, that involve every American
voter. 65 The national implications of that simple, yet profound, fact clearly
155. FRANCES Fox PIvEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, WHY AMERICANS STILL DON'T VOTE:
AND WHY POLITICIANS WANT IT THAT WAY 65 (2000).
156. Id. at 73.
157. See generally Reform Party of Fla. v. Black, 885 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 2004).
158. Id. at 312.
159. Id. at 318 (Lewis, J., concurring).
160. Id. at 316 (Lewis, J., concurring).
161. Id. at 313.
162. Reform Party of Fla., 885 So. 2d at 313 (citing IOWA CODE ANN. § 68A.102(16)
(2003)).
163. Id. at 319.
164. 460 U.S. 780 (1983) [hereinafter Anderson I]; see also Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S.
724 (1974); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
165. Anderson I1, 460 U.S. at 795.
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call for a federal statute applicable in all fifty states and the District of Co-
lumbia. The present state of our federal election law should not stop at as-
suring the right of individual voters to cast a vote for president only when the
candidate is the nominee of one of the major parties.
Efforts to deal with this problem by enacting a federal statute capable of
overriding existing state laws, on the subject of ballot access for non-major
party candidates, would not suffice. Conceivably, there could be an effort
made under HAVA to condition federal grants for improved state electoral
systems on the state's adoption of laws that would specifically grant ballot
access to non-major party candidates in a non-discriminatory manner. How-
ever, that hit or miss strategy is questionable because it does not really con-
front the problem. The mythology of this extra-constitutional political sys-
tem must be pierced, not by bribing states to allow a challenger from outside
that system, but by permitting truly unbiased freedom and equality in the
electoral arena.
Professor Jamin B. Raskin, in Overruling Democracy: The Supreme
Court vs. The American People, offers this trenchant observation:
the "two-party system" is neither a historical trend nor a constitu-
tionally driven public institution but a kind of vast political anti-
trust conspiracy.
... [I]t has successfully reshaped the essential features of our elec-
toral institutions, from ballot-access laws to ... debate-access laws
to presidential campaign public financing laws. This "two-party
system" exists indeed, and with a vengeance. 66
Surely it is difficult to imagine that when the Framers were arguing in the
debates that took place during the period of ratification for the creation of a
new democratic republic, they believed it would be based on a framework of
a two-party system; or, that it would operate to the exclusion of the possibil-
ity that a multiparty system could emerge. It certainly was not consciously
barred and excluded from future consideration. 167 It is true that Madison in
his Federalist No. 10 inveighed against factions and the peril they could pose
for a nascent Republic. 168 It is also well established that the term faction, as
used in that context, could be equated with a political party. 169 However,
there is scant evidence that Madison took a binary approach, which excluded
166. JAMIN B. RASKIN, OVERRULING DEMOCRACY: THE SUPREME COURT VS. THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE 98 (2003).
167. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
168. See id.
169. See id.
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the possibility that no more than two views could be refined to solve future
problems that might beset the new democracy with its republican approach to
governance. 
170
Morris P. Fiorina was cited in this article as deploring the decline of
"collective responsibility" in solving our problems as a nation.71 ' Fiorina
alleged that a generation has passed since "parties have provided an 'ade-
quate' degree of collective responsibility."'' 72 This in turn, he believed, had
produced "deleterious consequences.' 73 He also offered the conclusion that
"[s]ince 1965 the parties have done little or nothing to earn the loyalties of
modem Americans."', 74 This trenchant observation, I believe, cannot be dis-
missed a quarter of a century later as a remark out of time and out of place.
75
Two of the consequences of political decline resulting from the deficit in the
collective responsibility of our existing duopoly are: "the growing impor-
tance of single-issue politics and the growing alienation of the American
citizenry."'7 6 Another profound result of our bipolar domestic politics is
what Fiorina describes as immobilism, which specifically refers to critical
problems regarding energy, public debt, and the attendant higher costs they
will invoke in the future. 77 How prophetic indeed is his observation long
ago that:
political inability to take actions that entail short-run costs ordinar-
ily will result in much higher costs in the long-run [for the Ameri-
can people who] ... will not have an opportunity to choose be-
tween two or more such long-term plans. Although both parties
promise tough, equitable policies, in the present state of our poli-
tics, neither can deliver.'
78
These statements may seem morose or Cassandra-like pronouncements
from the Academy. However, an array of different sources, including both
political scientists and law school academics across America, are writing on
170. See id.
171. Fiorina, supra note 115, at 26.
172. Id. at 27.
173. Id. at 28.
174. Id. at 33.
175. Seeid. at 26.
176. Fiorina, supra note 115, at 39.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 40.
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this subject and asking whether the most recent decade's elections validate
Fiorina's need for greater accountability.179
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE UNITED STATES' BI-PARTISAN ORIENTED
BALLOT ACCESS LAWS
In Williams v. Rhodes, the United States Supreme Court decided an issue
regarding ballot access in an election involving the contest for presidency. 80
Williams not only involved the issue of an individual candidate, namely
George Wallace, the controversial former Governor of Alabama, but also
involved Wallace's newly-formed American Independent Party.18' Although
Wallace's petition to secure a place on the Ohio ballot garnered over 450,000
signatures in six months, far more than Ohio required for a new party, he was
not given a place on the ballot because he missed the deadline under Ohio
law.' The parties who received ten percent of the vote cast for the previous
gubernatorial election were automatically granted ballot access. 183 However,
the nominees of these parties were not chosen until later at the national gen-
eral election. 84 Wallace won this lawsuit on the grounds that the Ohio ballot
access law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution by giving
preferential treatment to the two major parties: Republican and Democ-
ratic. 18 Further, the Court held the associational rights of voters who wished
to vote for an Independent candidate were violated under the First Amend-
ment. 86 The Court applied strict scrutiny, which requires the state to show a
compelling interest to warrant interference with an individual's right to asso-
ciate. 18 Ohio had argued that its law should be sustained to further the com-
promise and stability that inheres in the two-party system.18
In reply to that argument, the Court reasoned that the Ohio law did not,
as applied, simply support a concept or a construct of a two-party system.
89
179. See generally DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN & RICHARD L. HASEN, ELECTION LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 2004).
180. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
181. Id. at 26.
182. Id. at 26-27. The number of signatures actually exceeded fifteen percent of the bal-
lots cast in the last election for governor, which was required by Ohio law. Id. at 27. Three
years later, the Court upheld a Georgia statute requiring five percent for independent candi-
dates. See Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
183. Williams, 393 U.S. at 26.
184. See id. at 33.
185. Id. at 34.
186. See id. at 32.
187. Id. at 31.
188. Williams, 393 U.S. at 32.
189. Id.
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It was clearly drawn to advantage the political chances of two specific, iden-
tifiable parties: Republican and Democratic. 90 The Court went on to chal-
lenge Ohio's right, in essence, to create a permanent political monopoly.'
Secondly, the Court reasoned that competitive politics is important because it
produces new ideas and different programmatic approaches that all require
First Amendment protection.1 92 Therefore, it is also important to permit
freedom of association to advance those new and different approaches.
193
Furthermore, if all new parties are destined to be stillborn because they are
not granted time to lay a foundation on which to grow through active partici-
pation in the electoral process, they would be robbed of the advantages that
both existing major parties enjoy.194
Pausing at this point to reflect on the Florida ballot access statute in-
volved in Reform Party of Florida, I question both the practicality and con-
stitutionality of the statutory language. 95 The statute grants ballot access
only to the nominee of a "national party" which holds a "national conven-
tion. '196 Determining what constitutes a national party should not be a judi-
cial function, even with courts having the benefit of expert testimony from
political consultants, political scientists, media consultants, or a wide variety
of other talents associated with the giant conglomerates that now make up
the national party campaigns for the American presidency.
On the other hand, section 103.021 (4)(b) of the Florida Statutes clearly
involves in-state petitioning by a new party candidate for President of the
United States as a qualifying procedure for ballot access.1 97 It is foreseeable
that this legislation will pass constitutional muster under current precedents,
going back to Williams, and more specifically, Jenness v. Fortson.98 How-
ever, other efforts by state legislatures to regulate political party conventions
and standing of putative candidates for the presidency should be regarded as
highly suspect. Conventions of the established major parties are not deci-
sion-making bodies. They are simply showcases where a party merchandises
its wares or, at the very least, attempts to do so.
190. See id. In his concurring opinion, Justice Douglas added "Ohio... has effectively
foreclosed its presidential ballot to all but Republicans and Democrats." Id. at 35 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
191. Id. at 32.
192. Williams, 393 U.S. at 32.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 33.
195. FLA. STAT. § 103.021(4)(a)-(b) (2004).
196. § 103.021(4)(a).
197. § 103.021(4)(b).
198. 403 U.S. 431 (1971) (holding that a state's nominating petition requirement did not
violate the First Amendment).
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Aside from the officiousness and the emptiness in any meaningful sense
of a national convention as a vital cog in the machinery of our democracy,
United States Supreme Court cases like Eu v. San Francisco County Democ-
ratic Central Committee'99 have led me to wonder how hospitable the judi-
cial climate will be to statutorily link the role of national conventions of even
major parties directly to the electoral process. Admittedly, Eu struck down
severe state regulation of party committees' endorsement of political candi-
dates as violating the First and Fourteenth Amendments.20 0 Nonetheless, the
argument that the overarching right of the American people to choose the
President should be conditioned on a party convention nomination is simply
indefensible. In Eu, California argued that strict scrutiny was not required of
the statutory regulation, but Justice Marshall rejected that argument.20'
I next approach the problem raised by the Florida Ballot Access Law
from the broader perspective of the states' laws both generally in this article
and in more detail in the appendix explaining the ballot laws in all fifty
states. 21 2 Richard Winger, founder and long-time editor of Ballot Access
News in San Francisco, provides an excellent and highly critical historical
review of ballot access laws for all fifty states through 2002.203 Winger
points out that it was only in the late 1930s that what he labels "massive peti-
tion requirements" began.2°4 Then abruptly in 1971 with the Court's decision
in Jenness v. Fortson, which was only three years after the Williams decision
discussed above, the Court virtually called a halt to efforts by Independents
and minor or third parties to protest the raising of the petition barrier to
heights that have made the present duopoly invincible.2 5
An earlier warning, no less alarming in tone, was published in a lengthy
article by Bradley A. Smith, entitled Judicial Protection of Ballot-Access
Rights: Third Parties Need Not Apply. 216 Smith developed a theme similar to
Mr. Winger. 207  Together these articles represent a body of opinion with
which I wish to publicly associate myself. They are germane to the analysis
and discussion of the Supreme Court of Florida's decision on the electoral
199. 489 U.S. 214 (1989).
200. Id. at 233.
201. Id. at 222. But see Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Associational Rights of Major Political
Parties: A Skeptical Inquiry, 71 TEX. L. REv. 1741 (1993).
202. See infra Appendix.
203. Richard Winger, The Supreme Court and the Burial of Ballot Access: A Critical
Review of Jenness v. Fortson, 1 ELECTION L.J. 235 (2002) [hereinafter Winger I].
204. Id. at 236.
205. Id. at 235.
206. Bradley A. Smith, Judicial Protection of Ballot-Access Rights: Third Parties Need
Not Apply, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 167 (1991).
207. See id.; Winger I, supra note 203.
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process. Also, the two articles cited above furnish an opportunity to go be-
yond analysis of the decisions themselves and to offer some thoughts on pos-
sible guidelines on what the future of ballot access laws should be and to
venture some additional thoughts on a uniform, truly national approach to
how we elect our President in the twenty-first century.20 8 At the same time
we fully recognize that ours is a federal system where states both historically
and constitutionally have certain responsibilities about how our elections are
conducted.
We must necessarily begin with the recognition of the overwhelming
power of the two major parties-the past and present duopoly that has al-
ready been referred to. I shall leave much of the history of that development
to others. However, I must be forgiven if I note that it is not merely a per-
sonal predilection, but well documented by these historians that it is third
parties as far back as the early nineteenth century that produced both ideas
and action on a variety of fronts-from women's rights, to child labor, to
progressive electoral reforms designed to enlarge the role of individual vot-
ers and battle against bossism and corruption in the ranks of both capital and
labor.2 °9
James B. Weaver received eight percent of the popular vote in 1892 as
the candidate of the Populist Party. Many of the reforms contained in his
platform were taken over by the Democratic Party;2 '" some by Theodore
Roosevelt in his third party run in 1912 as nominee of the Progressive Party,
when he garnered twenty-seven percent of the popular vote.212 Such devel-
opments led to Richard Hofstadters' famous remark in 1912 that third parties
"sting like a bee and then die. 213
It has been pointed out that it was the spectacular third party run of the
Bull Moose candidate, Theodore Roosevelt, which sparked the passage of
new or revised ballot access laws precisely designed to block gains by Inde-
pendent and third party candidates. 1 4
As the state laws across the land are examined, it will be noted that
many states are not satisfied to impose the barrier to ballot access in terms of
208. Winger I, supra note 203.
209. See V.0. KEY, JR., POLITICS, PARTIES, & PREssuRE GROups 257-58 (5th ed. 1964);
STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE ET AL., THIRD PARTIES IN AMERICA 8 (2d ed. 1984); Smith, supra note
206, at 169.
210. KEY, supra note 209, at 257; Smith, supra note 206, at 170.
211. KEY, supra note 209, at 257-58.
212. Id. at 263; see also ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 209, at 86.
213. Stephen E. Ambrose & Richard D. Lamm, Why America Needs a New Political
Party, at http://www.americanreform.org/Lamm/new_political_party.html (last visited Mar.
30, 2005).
214. See Smith, supra note 206, at 170.
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a fixed percentage of the registered voters or the votes cast for governor or
state official in a particular prior state election." 5 They include a wide vari-
ety of procedural restrictions on who may circulate petitions and may require
certain arcane information from the signer, such as a voter affidavit num-
ber.2 1
6
While all the above is going on, it should be reiterated that major party
candidates, however, are totally exempt no matter how obscure their identi-
ties may have been in their past life.217 If they are clothed in the major party
banner they need not spend their time petitioning to be assured that their
names have been placed on the ballot.218 It is their shield against the de-
mands of time, money, and expenditure of effort to legitimate their place-
ment and right to compete in the public arena of an electoral campaign for
public office.219
What then are, and should be, the justifications for the tendency of state
ballot access laws to be exclusionary and thereby lend official state sanction
to the duopoly of political power complained of by Smith, Winger, and the
co-author of this article? The most common reasons stated are that this du-
opolistic system has given us compromise and political stability. 20 Ancillary
reasons are that these restrictive laws prevent ballot confusion and assure the
orderly administration of the electoral proceed that is necessary if citizens are
to be allowed to cast an effective vote.22 1
In Munro v. Socialist Workers Party,222 the United States Supreme
Court considered a ballot access requirement, in a so-called blanket primary
for a United States Senate seat, to determine whether a candidate should re-
ceive placement on the general election ballot if they do not receive at least
one percent of the votes cast for that office in the primary. 223 Dean Peoples,
a candidate of the Socialist Workers Party, was on the primary ballot with
thirty-two other candidates from other parties.224 However, out of 681,690
votes cast, he received only 596 or .00009 percent of total votes. 225 He was
denied placement on the ballot.226 In the suit that followed, the federal court
215. See id. at 176-77.
216. Id. at 176.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See Smith, supra note 206, at 176-77.
220. See id. at 179.
221. See id. at 180.
222. 479 U.S. 189 (1986).
223. ld. at 190-91.
224. Id. at 192.
225. Id. at 192 n.9.
226. Id. at 192.
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of appeals ruled in his favor, and in answer to the State of Washington's
proffered defense that Mr. People's low vote total showed insufficient com-
munity support to suffer his candidacy through a general election, it said:
"'Washington's political history evidences no voter confusion from ballot
overcrowding." ,
227
In overruling the court of appeals and approving People's exclusion
from the ballot, Justice White accepted the truth of that historical fact but
nevertheless went on to say: "We have never required a State to make a par-
ticularized showing of the existence of voter confusion, ballot overcrowding,
or the presence of frivolous candidacies prior to the imposition of reasonable
restrictions on ballot access., 22' He went on to state (astonishingly so, in this
writer's opinion) that: "[i]n Jenness v. Fortson, [for example] we conducted
no inquiry into the sufficiency and quantum of the data supporting the rea-
sons for Georgia's 5% petition-signature requirement., 229  In the Munro
opinion, the Court referred to its previous decision in Storer in which a can-
didate had been barred from a place on the California ballot by a party disaf-
filiation provision in the state's electoral code, to renounce the idea that em-
pirical evidence was required in cases challenging a state's ballot access
laws.230 Testing the law's constitutionality does not require proof of a com-
pelling state interest. 231 It was enough for the state to allege that it was seek-
ing to protect the voters, and it was not necessary to justify the means em-
ployed or make any effort beyond the assertion itself that the voters were
better off with a more limited choice of candidates.232 It is noteworthy that
Justice Marshall, in a dissent, made this telling rejoinder:
The necessity for [a higher standard of review] becomes evident
when we consider that major parties, which by definition are ordi-
narily in control of legislative institutions, may seek to perpetuate
themselves at the expense of developing minor parties. The appli-
cation of strict scrutiny to ballot access restrictions ensures that
measures taken to further a State's interest in keeping frivolous
candidates off the ballot do not incidentally impose an impermissi-
ble bar to minor-party access.233
227. Munro, 479 U.S. at 194 (quoting Socialist Workers Party v. Munro, 765 F.2d 1417,
1420 (9th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 479 U.S. 189 (1986)).
228. Id. at 194-95.
229. Id. at 195.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 200-01.
232. Munro, 479 U.S. at 194-95.
233. Id. at 201 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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In another commentary, Professor Michael J. Klarman points out the
other problem with the Court's decision in Munro as it relates to ballot ac-
cess requirements affecting the formation of, and admission to, our political
system of independent or minor party candidates.234 In Munro, which in-
volved the exclusion of a minor-party candidate, Justice White dismissively
observed that "[i]t can hardly be said that Washington's voters are denied
freedom of association because they must channel their expressive activity
into a campaign at the primary as opposed to the general election.' '235 What
Justice White was saying is that for a minor-party candidate, one bite out of
the apple should be quite enough to satisfy that party's desire for its voice to
be heard.236 Justice White is implying that regardless of how widely diver-
gent the minor party's message might be, it need not be heard in the general
election campaign by the far wider audience of voters who tune in and par-
ticipate in the decisive contest.237 This obviously contributes to the en-
trenchment problem. In other words, one election in the primary phase of
our electoral process for minor parties is quite enough.
Another United States Supreme Court case that clearly indicates the
trend of the Court's thinking in the area of ballot access is the recent case of
Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party.238 Today many states ban multi-
party or cross-filing for a political office; i.e., they forbid fusion where more
than one political party seeks to nominate a candidate for the same office. 239
For example, a Minnesota law banned fusion in 1991.240 In upholding that
law, the Court, per Chief Justice Rehnquist, relied on the argument that:
"[s]tates certainly have an interest in protecting the integrity, fairness, and
efficiency of their ballots and election processes as means for electing public
officials., 24' The majority's opinion expressed extreme concern regarding
fusion destroying the unity of political parties, while promoting factionalism
within the parties and making the ballot "a billboard for political advertising"
instead of achieving what should be its only purpose-to choose candi-
dates.242
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Souter, dissented and
stated the majority was wrong in its "conclusion that the ballot serves no
234. Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85
GEO. L.J. 491, 522 (1997).
235. Munro, 479 U.S. at 199.
236. See id.
237. Id.
238. 520 U.S. 351 (1997).
239. Id. at 355.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 364.
242. Id. at 365.
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expressive purpose for the parties who place candidates on the ballot., 243
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg made an additional important point that "most
States have enacted election laws that impose burdens on the development
and growth of third parties. ' ,2' They went on to add "[t]he fact that the law
was both intended to disadvantage minor parties and has had that effect is a
matter that should weigh against, rather than in favor of, its constitutional-
ity.245
It is almost uniformly accepted by political scientists that the two-party
system is already aided immeasurably by our single-member system of both
congressional and state legislative districting in maintaining its dominant role
in our political system, and has for well over a century and a half.246 It is
further aided by our system of electing plurality winners in single member
districts; i.e., our "first past-the-post" system that has come to be known as
Duverger's law, and so inexorable is the resulting two-party system.247
Therefore, the misbegotten judicial concern for the protection of a two-party
system is unwarranted.
Liberalizing access to the ballot for both Independents and third parties
for legislative offices still leaves them the enormous difficulties of surmount-
ing that hurdle. For unitary offices such as the President of the United
States, or at the state level, that of governor and other state constitutional
officers, the first-past-the-post system would have quickly eliminated popu-
lar past presidential candidates such as President Theodore Roosevelt in his
1912 third-party new-party bid. 48 The major parties are not an endangered
species needing government, or for the purposes of the argument being made
here, or judicial protection, or the legislative hurdles posed by ballot access
laws conjured up in state legislature either by state legislators seeking their
own entrenchment or at the behest of party officials.
Richard Pildes, in his article Democracy and Disorder,249 has effectively
summarized and suggested an answer to the questions posed here, which I
believe are incorrect assumptions of the courts in general. 25° His assertions
are prompted by state legislation targeting the necessity of narrowly limiting
243. Timmons, 520 U.S. at 373.
244. Id. at 378 (emphasis added).
245. Id.
246. See Issacharoff& Pildes, supra note 114, at 675 n.121.
247. Id. at 675 & n. 121 (citations omitted).
248. See Bruce G. Peabody & Scott E. Gant, The Twice and Future President: Constitu-
tional Interstices and the Twenty-SecondAmendment, 83 MINN. L. REv. 565, 583 (1999).
249. Richard H. Pildes, Democracy and Disorder, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 695 (2001).
250. See generally id.
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ballot access, as well as the United States Supreme Court's misapplication of
concerns linking the maintenance of stability and order in our democracy.25'
Some would argue that American politics today suffers from a bi-polar
disorder because there is polarity manifested by a bi-partisan axis. The de-
gree to which ballot access laws have played some role in maintaining this
duopoly is open to debate and discussion. However, I believe this issue can-
not be dismissed as insignificant.
Bradley Smith, in a historical view of this question, pointed out that
ballot access laws did not really draw attention and undergo extensive revi-
sion until Theodore Roosevelt's Progressive Party out-polled his Republican
opponent, the incumbent President William Howard Taft, in the 1912 elec-
tion. 2 Although Roosevelt lost the election to Wilson, fourteen Progressive
Party members were elected to Congress under his banner.253 The Australian
secret ballot had not begun general adoption in this country until 1888.254
Until then, ballot access was not really a problem because parties prepared
their own ballots.255 However, the Socialist Party received its largest per-
centage, with six percent in the 1912 presidential election.256 As Smith fur-
ther recounts, the state legislatures then swung into action when Senator
Robert LaFollete, "trying to launch a new Progressive Party, faced ballot-
access laws that were 'an almost insuperable obstacle to the new party.' 257
Smith reached the conclusion that "[n]evertheless, strict ballot-access restric-
tions have helped the two major parties to achieve a vise-grip on American
politics never before attainable. 2 8 The parties' evolution to the present day
has been a long story in and of itself.25 9 Smith's second chapter began with
addressing Williams v. Rhodes, which was discussed earlier in this article.26°
Since this article has provided a summary of that evolution, we turn to the
issue regarding the proper state-level response to the problem confronting the
Supreme Court of Florida in Reform Party of Florida.
The difficulties facing the Supreme Court of Florida in interpreting the
state's ballot access statute for presidential candidates, along with this arti-
cle's material regarding the different approaches to ballot access in other
jurisdictions, might suggest that statutory reform would be prominent in any
251. Seeid. at 714-18.
252. Smith, supra note 206, at 170.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 172.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 170.
257. Smith, supra note 206, at 171.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. See discussion supra Part III; 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
[Vol. 29:3:571
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
list of changes to the electoral process concerning the presidential election.26 '
Following the 2000 presidential election, former Presidents Gerald Rudolph
Ford and James Earl Carter, along with many other notables, became the
appointed co-chairs of the National Commission on Federal Election Re-
form, and in due course, the Commission produced an impressive 356-page
report, which was reassuringly entitled To Assure Pride and Confidence in
the Electoral Process.62 Sadly, the report does not discuss how to reform
the states' ballot-access laws.263 In enacting the Help America Vote Act,
Congress also chose not to broach the subject.26 This article is not intended
as a criticism of either the Commission or Congress.
Florida has received the accolade of being listed as one of the "[1]eading
major reform states" by Daniel J. Palazzolo and James Ceaser in their re-
cently published book on electoral process reform.2 65 In that volume, Susan
A. MacManus has headed her contribution on Florida as "Nonstop Reform
Since Election 2000. ' '266 The most extensive reforms were in the first session
of the Florida legislature following the election of 2000, which made Florida
the eye of the storm that enveloped the nation in the thirty-five day wait for a
final judgment of who had won the presidential election. 267 That enormously
controversial and still debated discussion has produced a flood of commen-
tary in both books and articles, but it is not the subject of further discussion
here save for mentioning its important role in generating enormous attention
to the need for electoral reform both at the national and state level.268 In
Congress, the controversy produced the HAVA, and in Florida legislation
was introduced, and has been acted upon in every ensuing session of the state
261. See also Reform Party of Fla. v. Black, 885 So. 2d 303, 312-14 (Fla. 2004).
262. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FEDERAL ELECTION REFORM, To AssuRE PRIDE AND
CONFIDENCE IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 87 (2001), http://www.reformelections.
org/data/reports/99_fullreport.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2005).
263. See generally id.
264. See Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15301).
265. ELECTION REFORM: POLITICS AND POLICY 35 (Daniel J. Palazzolo & James W. Ceaser
eds., 2005).
266. Susan A. MacManus, Goodbye Chads, Butterfly Ballots, Overvotes, and Recount
Ruckuses! Election Reform in Florida, 2000 to 2003, in ELECTION REFORM, supra note 265, at
37.
267. Id. at 38. The President was only elected by a United States Supreme Court decision.
See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 101-03 (2000); The Presidential Election is Finally Done,
WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2000, at C15, 2000 WL 29921494.
268. See ELECTION REFORM: POLITICS AND POLICY, supra note 265, at 35.
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269legislature, dealing with changes and reforms in the electoral process.
However, for the purposes of this article, it should be emphasized that none
of the legislation touches on ballot access by independents or third parties. 7°
Perhaps this is because the 1999 changes in the law on that subject were so
recent that it seemed unnecessary. However, more likely it was true that at
both the national and state levels, in the rush to reform, the subject of ballot
access was simply not on anyone's radar screen as a critical issue. This
seems a strange anomaly because it is almost universally accepted that had
Ralph Nader, a third party-then the Green Party candidate-not been on the
ballot in Florida, Vice President Gore would have received that state's
twenty-five electoral votes and won the presidency.27' However, across the
nation, most states that moved on election reform ignored the subject of bal-
lot access.272
I believe that against this background of indifference and inaction, the
likelihood of action at the state level-although in this article I confine my
attention to Florida, because of its principal focus on the aforementioned
decision of Reform Party of Florida v. Black and the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida's interpretation of minor-party ballot access-is only minimal, if not in-
deed highly unlikely. This is true despite Justice Lewis' concurring opinion
in which he almost plaintively decries the deficiencies of section 103.021 of
the Florida Statutes for failing to define adequately the terms "national
party" and "national convention" in order to provide needed judicial guide-
posts.
2 73
It is equally unrealistic, in my judgment, to think that Congress would
provide a remedy. For as the Court famously declared in its per curiam opin-
ion in Bush II, there is no affirmative right of the individual citizen to vote
for electors of the President in Florida or any other state. 274 That right is the
prerogative of state legislatures under Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the
269. Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (to be codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 15301); see also Katherine Harris, The Facts on Florida; Elections Systems
Ready for November, WASH. TIMEs, Oct. 20, 2004, at A19, 2004 WL 64166414.
270. See Paul Boudreaux, The Electoral College and Its Meager Federalism, 88 MARQ. L.
REv. 195, 241-42 (2004); Roberta A. Yard, Comment, American Democracy and Minority
Rule: How the United States Can Reform Its Electoral Process to Ensure "One Person, One
Vote," 42 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 185, 197-98 (2001); Richard A. Posner, Florida 2000: A
Legal and Statistical Analysis of the Election Deadlock and the Ensuing Litigation, 2000 Sup.
CT. REv. 1, 58 (2001).
271. Boudreaux, supra note 270, at 241-42; Yard, supra note 270, at 197-98.
272. See Richard Winger, Ballot Access News (Feb. 1, 2001), at http://www.ballot-
access.org/2001/0201.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2005).
273. Reform Party of Fla. v. Black, 885 So. 2d 303, 316 (Fla. 2004) (Lewis, J., concur-
ring).
274. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000).
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United States Constitution275 Moreover, the Court made it clear more than a
century ago in McPherson v. Blacker that the right of individuals to choose
the electors is a plenary power.276 Therefore, even though a state's constitu-
tion has granted the franchise to the people, "[t]he State, of course, after
granting the franchise in the special context of Article II, can take back the
power to appoint electors., 27 7 "[T]here is no doubt of the right of the legisla-
ture to resume the power at any time, for it can neither be taken away nor
abdicated. 2
71
In Bush 11, the Court hearkened back to its decision more than two dec-
ades earlier where, in a 5-4 decision on the ballet access law for independent
and minor parties of Ohio, they said: "[i]n the context of a Presidential elec-
tion, state-imposed restrictions implicate a uniquely important national inter-
est. For the President and the Vice President of the United States are the
only officials who represent all the voters in the Nation.
2 79
I believe that a constitutional amendment expunging the language of
Article II, Section 2, Clause 2, effectively abolishing the Electoral College, is
not the best path to reform the United States Constitution. Nor should state
court judges have to grapple with questions of how to define the meaning of
a "national party" or a "national convention," when such terms are linked to
a statutory scheme for ballot access for a presidential candidate. I empathize
with the frustration of the concurring justice in Reform Party of Florida .210 1
believe such language should be deleted from the statute. Far more impor-
tantly though, the energy for reform should be focused on amending the
United States Constitution to declare that it is the right of every voter to cast
a vote for President of the United States.
There is an overriding foundational principle that supports our democ-
racy. It was enunciated in one of the most famous cases in our constitutional
history, McCulloch v. Maryland,2  in which Chief Justice Marshall stated:
"[t]he government of the Union ... is, emphatically, and truly, a government
of the people. In form and in substance it emanates from them. Its powers
are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly on them, and for their
benefit., 28
2
275. Id.
276. 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892).
277. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 104.
278. McPherson, 146 U.S. at 35 (quoting S. REP. No. 395 (1874)).
279. Bush 11, 531 U.S. at 112 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (quoting Anderson v. Cele-
brezze, 460 U.S. 780, 794-95 (1983)).
280. See Reform Party of Fla., 885 So. 2d at 315-16 (Lewis, J., concurring).
281. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
282. Id. at 404-05.
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To preserve the important principle in the words just quoted, I believe
we should now-in view of past judicial precedents that have diminished the
peoples' right to choose unfettered by an entrenched party system-reassert
that right in the United States Constitution with a "Right to Vote" amend-
ment. It would do away with more than three decades of minor parties being
kept off of state ballots283 by what one writer calls "America's Signature
Exclusion. 284 The leading expert on ballot access in the United States and
editor for many years of The Ballot Access News, a monthly publication,
entitled a recent article devoted to the subject: The Supreme Court and the
Burial of Ballot Access: A Critical Review of Jenness v. Fortson. 285 The arti-
cle points out that in the last three decades the Supreme Court has cited Jen-
ness approvingly in nine opinions.286 Even more dramatic is that, in lower
courts, independent and minor parties have lost on constitutional grounds in
126 cases.287 Almost half of the state legislatures have followed suit by en-
acting stricter ballot access laws.288 The article lays all of this at the door of
Jenness and suggests the decision has made the states confident that they can
successfully bar minority parties and independent candidates. 89 Ralph
Nader was on forty-three state ballots in 2000.290 In the last presidential
election, he succeed in gaining ballot access in only thirty-four states.291 In
eighteen states, it was the Democratic Party that undertook legal action to
keep him off the ballot.292
The people cannot, in the words of Chief Justice John Marshall, demon-
strate that "[t]he government of the Union... is, emphatically, and truly a
government of the people, 293 because they are restricted by state legislatures
which are, in turn, sustained by the judicial branch. 294 The Constitution itself
283. See Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
284. RASKrN, supra note 166, at 91.
285. Winger I, supra note 203, at 235.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 249-52.
288. See id. at 246-49.
289. Id. at 248.
290. See Presidential Vote, BALLOT ACCESS NEWS, Jan. 1, 2001, at http://web.archive.org/
web/20020203231432/http://www.ballot-access.org/2001/0101.html (last visited Mar. 30,
2005).
291. Richard Winger, Did the Democrats Err on Nader?, BALLOT ACCESS NEWS, Jan. 1,
2005, at http://www.ballot-access.org/2005/0101.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2005) [hereinafter
Winger II].
292. Id.
293. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316,404-05 (1819).
294. See generally Reform Party of Fla. v. Black, 885 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 2004) (Lewis, J.,
concurring).
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must spell out that great truth in the unmistakable language of the proposed
"Right to Vote" amendment.
IV. CONCLUSION
A vehicle does exist for the enactment of the proposed amendment in
House of Representatives Joint Resolution 28, which was introduced in the
108th Congress on March 4, 2003 by Congressman Jesse L. Jackson, Jr. of
Illinois. 295 In addition, in order to prevent courts from making decisions like
Reform Party of Florida, a proposed constitutional amendment should also
include provisions that: (i) guarantee every citizen the right to vote for Presi-
dent (or presidential elector to the extent the electoral college continues to
exist); (ii) limit the ability of states and the District of Columbia in regulating
presidential elections to issues surrounding placement of the ballot and de-
sign of the ballot; (iii) provide for equal technology to be used by the states
and the District of Columbia in connection with the casting and counting of
votes in presidential elections; and (iv) provide for uniform standards with
respect to ballot access for the office of the presidency. In his floor speech,
Jackson began with the following statement from Bush II: "[t]he individual
citizen has no federal constitutional right to vote for electors for the President
of the United States. ' 96 Jackson also referenced Alexander Keyssar's mag-
isterial work, The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the
United States.297 Jackson's floor statement bore the title, "Our Voting Sys-
tem Needs a New Constitutional Foundation", and section 1 of his proposed
amendment simply stated:
All citizens of the United States who are eighteen years of age or
older shall have the right to vote in any public election held in the
jurisdiction in which the citizen resides. The right to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States, any State, or any other
public or private person or entity, except that the United States or
any State may establish regulations narrowly tailored to produce
efficient and honest elections.298
Other significant provisions deal with the power of Congress to estab-
lish "election performance standards at least once every four years," for ex-
ample, by mandating periodic review on a quadrennial basis. 299 Further, sec-
295. H.R.J. Res. 28, 108th Cong. (2003).
296. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000).
297. KEYSSAR, supra note 154.
298. H.R.J. Res. 28.
299. Id.
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tion 4 provides for mandatory same day voter registration, and a provision
that state rules for appointing electors for President and Vice President shall
ensure that each Elector votes for the candidates chosen by a majority of the
voters.3°
The language quoted above makes it clear that strict scrutiny should be
applied in ballot access cases and not produce what Professor Lawrence
Tribe described in the treatise American Constitutional Law: "Jenness, in
contrast [to Williams v. Rhodes], shunned discussion of the standard of re-
view, contented itself with emphasizing that the laws being reviewed were
less suffocating than those in Williams, and found the state interests quite
sufficient to satisfy whatever standard it did apply." 30 1
Hopefully, what Professor Jamin Raskin has referred to as "America's
Signature Exclusion: How Democracy Is Made Safe for the Two-Party Sys-
tem"3°2 can be halted, as the United States Supreme Court would not con-
tinue to judge state laws on petitioning for ballot access by its current nebu-
lous standard. Additionally, another critic of the trend of United States Su-
preme Court decisions in this area of the law, access to the ballot, is Profes-
sor Richard L. Hasen of Loyola School of Law. 3 3 He has addressed what he
labels as "Protecting the Core of Political Equality" 3" in his book entitled
The Supreme Court and Election Law: Judging Equality from Baker v. Carr
to Bush v. Gore. 305 He sums up his chapter on the subject named above in
these carefully chosen words:
In sum, cases such as Jenness, Munro, and Timmons, may have
been wrongly decided. I say "may have been" rather than "were"
because we do not have enough evidence of (1) whether the inter-
ests put forward in the case to trump the equality right are ade-
quately supported by the evidence; and (2) if so, how the Court
should have engaged in the careful balancing of the rights. With-
out a doubt, there is good cause for concern that these cases were
wrongly decided and have had negative effects on the political
equality rights of third parties and independent candidates.
306
300. Id.
301. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1106 (2d ed. 1988).
302. See RASKIN, supra note 166, at 91-116.
303. See RICHARD L. HAsEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING
EQUALITY FROM BAKER V. CARR To BUSH V. GoRE (2003).
304. Id. at 73.
305. Id. at 73-100.
306. Id. at 99 (footnote omitted).
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Here, the author cites to Richard Winger's seminal article, The Supreme
Court and The Burial of Ballot Access: A Critical Review of Jenness v. Fort-
son.3"7 It is clear to me that the aforementioned line of authority would im-
peril any effort by Congress to enact a national freedom of access to the bal-
lot law. This conclusion is reached based upon the strictures against interfer-
ing with state legislatures and circumscribing their power in appointing elec-
tors.3 °8 Additionally, the doctrine interposed to limit congressional authority
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment also plays an integral part.30 9
In City ofBoerne v. Flores,1 ° the Court threw down the gauntlet to Congress
with respect to what would be regarded as "appropriate legislation," by al-
lowing Congress to enforce the substantive guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment.3 ' In deciding that case, the Court first relied on its own previ-
ous interpretations of First Amendment rights and struck down a congres-
sional enactment that would have gone beyond the Court's previous interpre-
tation of those rights.312 The Court ruled that Congress could not enlarge its
powers under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitu-
tion under the guise of implementing the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment.31 3 It would not only exceed Congress's authority, but it would
also infringe upon the prerogatives of the states.314
Clearly, the road that any constitutional amendment must travel is both
rocky and steep. However, as was suggested in the work by Alexander
Keyssar, previously cited, The Right to Vote: The Contested History of De-
mocracy in the United States, so eloquently stated:
[t]he history of the right to vote is a record of the slow and fitful
progress of the project, progress that was hard won and often sub-
ject to reverses. The gains so far reached need to be protected,
while the vision of a more democratic society can continue to in-
spire our hopes and our actions. 315
It is only too clear, I believe, that a congressional statute seeking to es-
tablish federal standards for the conduct of elections and the affirmative right
307. Winger I, supra note 203.
308. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. This section was interpreted to mean plenary in nature.
McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892).
309. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
310. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
311. Id. at519,536.
312. Id. at 518-27.
313. Id. at 534.
314. Id.
315. KEYssAR, supra note 154, at 324.
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to vote would be challenged under the doctrine of City ofBoerne v. Flores as
exceeding the authority of Congress under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.1 6 Indeed the present Court, with its dedication to the principles
laid down in McPherson and heavy reliance on the per curiam opinion in
Bush 11, would undoubtedly resort to a "one-two punch" if an effort was
made to proceed by statute, instead of a constitutional amendment.1 7
316. City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
317. See McPherson, 146 U.S. at 35; Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 100 (2000).
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APPENDIX: BALLOT ACCESS LAW OF THE FIFTY STATES
AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Alabama: Candidates may obtain access to the general election ballot for
the offices of President or Vice President of the United States through either
political party nomination or petition.38 Political parties that receive 20% of
the vote at the last general election qualify to have statewide ballot access.319
Nomination by petition requires signatures equal or exceeding 3% of electors
who cast ballots for the office of Governor in the last general election.
3 20
Alaska: To have a candidate's name on the general election ballot, the na-
tional committees of political parties which are recognized political parties in
Alaska select their Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates in a manner
prescribed by their party bylaws. 32 1 Any candidate not associated with one
of the aforementioned parties shall be established as a limited political party
and must gather signatures in the amount of at least 1% of the number of
voters who cast ballots for the office of President in the preceding presiden-
tial election.322
Arizona: Candidates from recognized political parties within Arizona may
place their candidates on the primary election ballot.32 3 However, any quali-
fied elector who is not a registered member of a recognized political party
324may be nominated through the means of a nomination petition. A new
political party that wishes to be recognized on the primary and general elec-
tion ballots must submit a petition with the number of signatures of qualified
electors totaling no less than 1 1/3 % of the total votes cast for governor or
presidential electors at the last preceding general election. 3
25
Arkansas: In order to have a political party's Presidential and Vice Presi-
dential candidates printed on the ballot, the party must nominate the candi-
dates via the primary election. 6 New political parties are able to nominate
by convention if the presidential election is the first general election after
318. ALA. CODE § 17-19-2(a) (1995).
319. ALA. CODE § 17-16-2 (1995).
320. ALA. CODE § 17-8-2.1(a)(1) (Supp. 2004).
321. ALASKA STAT. § 15.30.020 (Michie 2004).
322. ALASKA STAT. § 15.30.025(a) (Michie 2004).
323. ARiz. REv. STAT. § 16-301 (1996).
324. ARiz. REv. STAT. § 16-341(A) (2004).
325. ARIz. REv. STAT. § 16-801 (2004).
326. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-8-302(5)(A) (Michie Supp. 2003).
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certification as a party by the Secretary of State.327 Political groups who
have failed to obtain 3% of the total votes cast at an election for the office of
Governor or nominees for presidential elector wishing to have their nominee
placed on the general election ballot may file a petition with the Secretary of
State containing a minimum of 1000 signatures of qualified electors of the
state.328
California: If a minor political party wishes to become "qualified," thereby
giving them access to the primary ballot, they are required to gather signa-
tures equaling at least 1% of the entire vote of the state at the last preceding
gubernatorial election. 329 A party may also become qualified if the party
gathers a number of signatures on a nomination petition equal to or greater
than 10% of the entire vote of the state at the last preceding gubernatorial
election.33 °
Colorado: Any political party may nominate presidential electors by con-
vention. 331 Any candidate not wishing to affiliate with one of the major po-
litical parties may gain access to the general election ballot, other than by
primary or convention, by either paying a filing fee of $500 or by filing a
nominating petition with at least 5000 signatures of eligible electors.332
Connecticut: Nominations by minor parties may be made in accordance
with the party rules.333 A party wishing to nominate by petition must have
the petition signed by a number of qualified electors in the state equal to the
lesser of 1% of the votes cast in the preceding general election or 7500.
3 34
Delaware: A political party may be listed on the general election ballot only
when, twenty one days prior to the date of the primary election, the party has
registered a number of voters equal to at least 5/100 of 1% of the total num-
ber of voters registered in Delaware as of December 31 of the immediately
preceding year.335 A primary election shall be held for all political parties
unless they opt to nominate their candidates otherwise.336 The nominations
327. Id.
328. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 7-7-205, 7-8-302(5)(B) (Michie Supp. 2003).
329. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 5 100(b) (West Supp. 2005).
330. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 5 100(c) (West 2003).
331. COLO. REv. STAT. § 1-4-302(1) (2004).
332. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 1-4-303(1), 1-4-802(l)(c)(I) (2004).
333. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-451 (West 2002).
334. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-453(d)(1)-(2) (West 2002).
335. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 3001 (1999).
336. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 3181 (1999).
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of the candidates for electors of President and Vice President are to be certi-
fied to the State Election Commissioner by the presiding officer and secre-
tary of the state convention or committee of each political party eligible to
place candidates on the ballot.337 No candidate may appear on Delaware's
general election ballot as an unaffiliated candidate unless they have not been
affiliated with any political party for at least three months prior to the filing
of a sworn declaration stating such with the State Election Commissioner.338
Unaffiliated candidates must also have filed a nominating petition signed by
at least 1% of the total number of registered voters in the state.339
Florida: A minor political party that is affiliated with a national political
party holding a national convention to nominate candidates for President and
Vice President can have the names of its candidates for President and Vice
President printed on the general election ballot by filing a certificate with the
Department of State that names the candidates and lists the required number
of persons to serve as electors. 340 A minor political party that is not affiliated
with a national party holding a national convention to nominate candidates
for President and Vice President can have the names of its candidates for
President and Vice President printed on the general election ballot if a peti-
tion is signed by 1% of the registered electors of Florida.3 4'
Georgia: The two ways in which candidates may qualify for an election are
through a nomination in a primary conducted by a political party or by filing
a nomination petition as an independent candidate or as a nominee of a po-
litical body.342 Nominations of candidates for public office, other than local
office, can be made by nomination petitions signed by electors.343 A nomi-
nation petition for a candidate seeking office must be signed by those regis-
tered and eligible to vote in the election in which the candidate is seeking to
be elected, and those signing must total at least 1% of the total number of
registered voters eligible to vote in the last election for the office in which
344the candidate is running.
337. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 3301(a) (1999).
338. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 3002 (1999).
339. Id.
340. FLA. STAT. § 103.021(4)(a) (2004).
341. FLA. STAT. § 103.021(4)(b) (2004).
342. GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-130 (2003).
343. GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-170(a) (2003).
344. GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-170(b) (2003).
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Hawaii: Candidates of political parties which have been qualified to place
candidates on the primary and general election ballots must have the appro-
priate official from their party file a sworn application with the chief election
officer which states, among other things, that the candidates are the duly
chosen candidates of both the state and national party. 345 For candidates of
non-qualified parties or groups, a petition must be filed with the chief elec-
tion officer that contains the signatures of currently registered voters equal-
ing at least 1% of the votes cast in Hawaii during the last presidential elec-
tion.346
Idaho: A political party nominee for President can be printed on Idaho bal-
lots only if the Secretary of State, in his or her sole discretion, determined
that the nominee's candidacy is generally advocated or recognized in na-
tional news media throughout the United States, or if a petition for nomina-
tion is filed with the Secretary of State by members of a political party to
which the candidate belongs. 347 The petition must contain an amount of sig-
natures from qualified electors which equals at least 1% of the number of
votes cast in the state for presidential electors at the previous general election
in which a President of the United States was elected.348
Illinois: A presidential candidate may have their name printed on the pri-
mary ballot of their political party by filing a petition in the State's Board of
Elections office which is signed by not less than 3000 or more than 5000
primary electors who are members of the candidate's political party.34 9
Nomination of independent candidates and candidates of newly formed po-
litical parties for offices filled by voters of the state may be made by nomina-
tion papers signed by 1% of the number of voters who voted in the immedi-
ately preceding statewide general election, or 25,000 qualified voters of the
state, whichever is less. 35
0
Indiana: A candidate not wishing to affiliate with a major political party
and who wishes to become a candidate of a minor party not qualified to
nominate candidates in a primary election or by political party convention,
and who wishes to be a candidate for the office of President or Vice Presi-
dent at the general election, must file a written consent to become a candi-
345. HAw. REv. STAT. § 11-1 13(c)(1)(C) (1993).
346. HAw. REv. STAT. § 11-1 13(c)(2)(B) (1993).
347. IDAHO CODE § 34-732(1)-(2) (Michie 2001).
348. IDAHO CODE § 34-732(3)(a) (Michie 2001).
349. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7-11 (2003).
350. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-2, 10-3 (2003).
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date and a petition of nomination with the Election Division.35' In order to
be placed on the general election ballot, a minor party candidate must obtain
signatures of voters equal to 2% of the total votes cast for Secretary of State
in the election district the candidate seeks to represent.352
Iowa: Nominations for candidates for President and Vice President may be
made by nomination petitions signed by at least 1500 eligible electors living
in at least ten counties in the state.353 Any convention or caucus of eligible
electors representing a political organization which is not a political party
may nominate one candidate for each office being voted on during the gen-
eral election.354 However, in order for a political organization to have a valid
nomination for a state-wide elective office, there must be at least 250 eligible
electors and at least one eligible elector from each of the twenty five counties
in attendance at the convention or caucus where the nomination is made.355
Kansas: In order for a political party to become recognized, the party shall
file a petition with the signatures of at least 2% of the total vote cast for all
candidates for the office of Governor in the last preceding general election.356
Party nominations for public office candidates can be made only by a dele-
gate, mass convention, primary election, or caucus of qualified voters be-
longing to one political party with a national or state organization. 357 Party
nominations for presidential electors can be made only by a delegate, mass
convention, or caucus of qualified electors belonging to a political party with
a national or state organization.358 Nominations other than party nominations
must all be independent nominations. 359 Independent nominations for each
candidate for any office elected by voters from the entire state can be made
by nomination petitions signed by at least 5000 qualified voters.36 °
Kentucky: Any political organization not constituting a political party
whose candidate received 2% of the vote of the state at the last preceding
election for presidential electors may nominate, by a convention or primary
election corresponding to the party's constitution and bylaws, candidates for
351. IND. CODE §§ 3-8-6-12, 3-8-6-14 (2002).
352. IND. CODE § 3-8-6-3 (2002).
353. IOWACODE § 45.1(1) (1999).
354. IOWA CODE § 44.1 (1999).
355. Id.
356. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-302a (Supp. 2003).
357. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-301 (2000).
358. Id.
359. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-303(b) (Supp. 2003).
360. Id.
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offices to be voted for during any regular election.361 A candidate may be
nominated by a petition of electors qualified to vote for the candidate for any
office to be voted for during a regular election.362 "A petition of nomination
for a state officer, or any officer for whom all the electors of the state are
entitled to vote," must contain the names of at least 5000 petitioners.363
Louisiana: Candidates for presidential nominee must qualify in accordance
with the procedures established by their political party.36 Before qualifying
as a candidate of a political party for presidential nominee, a person must pay
a qualifying fee of $750 and additional fees imposed by state central commit-
tees or obtain a nominating petition with handwritten signatures of at least
1000 registered voters affiliated with the political party from each of the
state's congressional districts.365
Maine: A political party qualifies to participate in a primary election if the
party was listed on the ballot of either of the two preceding general elections
and if: 1) the party held municipal caucuses in at least one municipality in
each county during the election year in which the designation was listed on
the ballot, an interim election year, and the year of the primary election; 2)
the political party held a state convention during the election year in which
the designation was listed on the ballot and any interim election year; and 3)
the party's candidate for Governor or President received at least 5% of the
total vote cast in the state for Governor or President in either of the two pre-
ceding general elections.366 A party which qualifies to participate in a pri-
mary election must hold a state convention in the same election year in order
to have its candidates' party name printed on the general election ballot of
that year.367 A party must submit nomination petitions for a slate of candi-
dates for the office of presidential elector that are signed by at least 4000 and
no more than 6000 voters.368
361. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 118.325(1) (Michie 2004); see also Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
118.015 (defining "political party").
362. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 118.315(1) (Michie 2004).
363. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 118.315(2) (Michie 2004).
364. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1280.22 (West Supp. 2005).
365. Id.; see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:464(c) (West Supp. 2005) (imposing addi-
tional fees by state central committees).
366. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 301(1) (West Supp. 2004); see also ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21-A, § 311 (West 1993 & Supp. 2004) (prescribing roles for municipal caucuses).
367. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 301(2) (West 1993); see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 2 1-A, § 321 (West 1993) (prescribing rules for state conventions).
368. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354(5) (West 1993).
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Maryland: Nominations for public offices that are filled by elections gov-
erned by Maryland's election laws must be made by party primary for candi-
dates of major political parties, or by petition for candidates of political par-
ties that do not conduct nominations by primary, and candidates not affiliated
with any political party.369 A candidate seeking nomination by petition may
not have their name placed on the general election ballot unless they file ap-
propriate board petitions signed by at least 1% of the total number of regis-
tered voters who are eligible to vote for the office for which the nomination
by petition is sought, and at least 250 registered voters who are eligible to
vote for the office.37°
Massachusetts: A political party may have its candidates appear on the
primary election ballot by: 1) filing nomination papers signed by at least
2500 voters; 2) the state secretary placing candidates on the ballot who have
been generally advocated or recognized in the national news media; and 3)
the chairperson of each party's state committee designating on written lists
the names of its candidates. 371 Nominations of candidates to the general elec-
tion ballot for presidential electors may be made by nomination papers with
372
no less than 10,000 voters' signatures.
Michigan: A political party must make nominations by means of caucuses
or conventions if the party's principal candidate "received less than 5% of
the total vote cast for all candidates for the office of [S]ecretary of [S]tate in
the last preceding state election, either in the state or in any political subdivi-
sion affected. 3 73 Therefore, the party is not allowed to make its nominations
using the direct primary method.374 Political parties may use a qualifying
petition to nominate candidates for statewide elective offices as long as the
petition is signed by a number of qualified and registered electors equal to at
least 1% of the total number of votes cast for all candidates for Governor at
the last election in which a Governor was elected.375 A qualifying petition
for the office of President must be signed by at least 100 registered electors
376in each of at least one half of the congressional districts of the state.
369. MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 5-701 (2003).
370. MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 5-703(e)(1) (2003).
371. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 53, § 70E (1991).
372. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 53, § 6 (2004).
373. MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 168.532 (1989).
374. Id.
375. MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 168.590b(2) (2004).
376. MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 168.590b(4) (2004).
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Minnesota: Candidates for any partisan office who do not seek the nomina-
tion of a major political party must be nominated by means of a nominating
petition.377 The number of signatures required on a nominating petition must
equal 1% of the total number of individuals voting in Minnesota at the last
preceding state general election or 2000 signatures, whichever is less.378
Mississippi: A petition requesting that a candidate for an independent or
special election be placed on the ballot for an office elected by the state at
large must be signed by at least 1000 qualified electors.379 When a political
party nominates by national convention, the Secretary of State must certify to
the circuit clerks of the several counties the names of all the candidates for
President and Vice President of the United States.38°
Missouri: Unless otherwise provided for, all candidates for elective office
must be nominated at a primary election in accordance with Missouri's elec-
tion laws.381 A group creating a new political party throughout the state must
file a petition with the Secretary of State, which contains the signatures of at
least 10,000 registered voters of the state. 382
Montana: An individual who wishes to run for President or Vice President
as an independent or minor party candidate must file a petition for nomina-
tion with the signatures of 5000 electors or signatures of electors equaling
5% or more of the total votes cast for the successful candidate for governor
at the last general election, whichever is less.
383
Nebraska: Partisan candidates running for President and Vice President of
the United States must be certified by the national nominating convention in
order to be listed on the general election ballot.384 Nonpartisan candidates or
candidates from newly established political parties running for President and
Vice President may obtain a position on the general election ballot by filing a
petition signed by at least 2500 registered voters.385
377. MiNN. STAT. § 204B.03 (1992).
378. MINN. STAT. § 204B.08 (2005).
379. MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-359(1)(a) (1972 & Supp. 2001).
380. MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-785(1) (1972 & Supp. 2001).
381. MO. REV. STAT. § 115.339 (2003).
382. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 115.315(2), (5) (2003).
383. MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-10-504 (2003).
384. NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-620 (1998).
385. Id.
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Nevada: Candidates of a minor political party running for a partisan office
must not appear on the ballot for a primary election.386 Instead, those candi-
dates' names will be placed on the general election ballot if: 1) at the last
preceding general election, the minor party received for any of its candidates
for partisan office at least 1% of the total number of votes cast for the offices
of Representative in Congress; 2) on January 1 preceding a primary election,
the minor party has been designated as the political party on the voters' reg-
istration applications of at least 1% of the total number of registered voters in
Nevada; or 3) no later than the second Friday in August preceding the gen-
eral election, the minor party files a petition with the Secretary of State
which is signed by registered voters equaling at least 1% of the total number
of votes cast at the last preceding general election for the offices of Repre-
sentative in Congress.387
New Hampshire: A candidate may have their name placed on the ballot for
the state general election by submitting the requisite number of nomination
papers instead of obtaining a nomination through party primary. 388 The
nomination papers must have the names of 3000 registered voters, 1500 of
which must be from each United States congressional district in the state, in
order to nominate a candidate for President or Vice President of the United
States. 389 Each candidate for President who seeks nomination by nomination
papers must pay to the Secretary of State a single fee of $250 for both the
presidential and vice-presidential candidates at the time of filing declarations
of intent.3
90
New Jersey: Candidates, except electors of President and Vice President of
the United States nominated by political parties at state conventions, must be
nominated directly by petition or at the primary for the general election.3 9 1 A
party may nominate by petition its candidate for President and Vice President
by filing a petition with at least 800 voters' signatures in the aggregate for
each candidate nominated.392
New Mexico: If the rules of a minor political party require nomination by
political convention or by a method other than a political convention, the
386. NEV. REV. STAT. 293.1715(1) (2003).
387. NEV. REV. STAT. 293.1715(2) (2003).
388. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 655:40-b (1996 & Supp. 2003).
389. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 655:42(l) (1996 & Supp. 2003).
390. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 655:19-a (1996).
391. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:13-1 (West 1999).
392. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:13-5 (West 1999).
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names certified to the Secretary of State must be filed and accompanied by a
petition containing a list of signatures and addresses of voters totaling at least
1% of the total number of votes cast at the last preceding general election for
the President of the United states.393
New York: Petitions for any office to be filled by the voters of the entire
State of New York must be signed by at least 15,000 or 5%, whichever is
less, of the then active enrolled voters of the party in the state.394 Not less
than 100 or 5%, whichever is less, of those enrolled voters must reside in
each of one half of the congressional districts of the state.395 If there are
more candidates designated for nomination by a party for an office to be
filled by the voters of the entire state than there are vacancies, the nomina-
tion(s) of the party must be made at the primary election at which other can-
didates for public office are nominated and the candidate(s) receiving the
most votes will become the nominees of the party.
396
North Carolina: Any person seeking endorsement by the national political
party for the office of President can file petitions with the State Board of
Elections that are signed by 10,000 persons who are registered and qualified
voters in North Carolina and are affiliated with the same political party as the
candidate for whom the petitions are filed.397
North Dakota: The names of all candidates of each political party or prin-
ciple or no-party designation, who are shown to have been nominated for the
several offices in accordance with the certificates of nomination filed in the
Secretary of State's office, must be placed by the secretary of state on the
official ballot to be voted for at the next general election.398 Candidates can
be nominated by petition; however, each certificate of nomination by petition
must meet the specifications set forth in section 16.1-1 1-16. 399 If the nomi-
nation is for the office of President of the United States, there must be at
least 4000 signatures on the petition.4 °°
393. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-8-2(A)-(B), 1-8-3(C) (Michie 1978 & Supp. 2001).
394. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-136(1) (McKinney 1998).
395. Id.
396. N.Y. ELECTION LAW § 6-160(1) (McKinney 1998).
397. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-213.5 (2003).
398. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-13-04 (2004).
399. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 16.1-11-16, 16.1-12-02 (2004).
400. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-12-02 (2004).
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Ohio: One way in which candidates for the offices of President and Vice
President may have their names printed on the presidential ballot is by hav-
ing certified to the Secretary of State for placement on the presidential ballot
by authorized officials of an intermediate or minor political party that has
held a state or national convention for the purpose of choosing those candi-
dates or simply certified those candidates in accordance with the procedures
authorized by its party rules.4 °1 If the candidacy is to be voted on by electors
throughout the entire state, the nominating petition must be signed by no less
than 5000 qualified electors, yet contain no more than 15,000 signatures.40 2
Oklahoma: The names of candidates for the office of Presidential Elector
pledged to the nominee of a political party not recognized under the laws of
Oklahoma for President of the United States can only be printed on the ballot
by submitting petitions signed by a number of registered voters supporting
the candidacy of the nominee equal to at least 3% of the total votes cast in
the last general election for President and by filing those petitions with the
Secretary of the State Election Board.40 3
Oregon: A minor political party can nominate candidates for public office
only if it follows procedures set forth in its organizational documents. 4  A
nomination certificate made by individual electors must contain signatures of
electors in the electoral district equal to at least 1% of the total votes cast in
the electoral district for which the nomination is intended to be made, for all
candidates for presidential electors at the last general election.40 5
Pennsylvania: Where the nomination is for any office to be filled by the
electors of the state at large, the number of qualified electors signing the
nomination papers must be at least equal to 2% of the largest entire vote cast
for any elected candidate in the state at large at the last preceding election for
which state-wide candidates were voted.406
Rhode Island: Every even year, a state convention for each political party
must be held no later than October 14 of that year.407 In presidential election
years, these conventions must select the party nominees for presidential elec-
401. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 3505.10(B)(3) (Anderson Supp. 2003).
402. Olo REV. CODE ANN. § 3513.257(A) (Anderson Supp. 2003).
403. OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 10-101.2 (1997).
404. OR. REV. STAT. § 248.009(1) (2003).
405. OR. REV. STAT. § 249.740(1) (2003).
406. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2911 (b) (West 1994).
407. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-12-13 (2003).
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tors and their names will be placed on the ballot for the upcoming election.4 °8
At the state convention, parties are to adopt a platform and handle any other
business that may properly come before the convention.40 9 The nomination
papers of a candidate for the party nomination or an independent candidate
for presidential elector must be signed, in the aggregate, by no less than 1000
voters.41°
South Carolina: Nominations for candidates for the offices to be voted on
in a general or special election may be conducted by political party primary,
political party convention, or petition.411 A candidate's nominating petition
must contain the signatures of at least 5% of the qualified registered electors
of the geographical area of the office for which the candidate runs, as long as
no petition candidate is required to furnish the signatures of more than
10,000 qualified registered electors for any office.412
South Dakota: Any candidate for President or Vice President who is not
nominated by a primary election may be nominated by filing a certificate of
nomination with the Secretary of State.413 The number of signatures required
must equal to at least 1% of the total combined vote cast for Governor at the
last certified gubernatorial election.41 4
Tennessee: Political parties may nominate their candidates for any office,
other than the offices of Governor, United States Senator, members of the
United States House of Representatives, and members of the Tennessee Gen-
eral Assembly, by primary election or any method authorized under the rules
of the party.415 Persons nominated other than by the primary election method
for offices filled by voters of more than one county or for statewide offices
must be immediately certified to the coordinator of elections by the chair of
the nominating body.41 6 The coordinator of elections must then certify those
nominees to the county election commissions in each county in which the
nominees are candidates by the qualifying deadlines.417 Nominating peti-
tions must be signed by the candidate and twenty-five or more registered
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-14-7 (2003).
411. S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-11-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 2004).
412. S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-11-70 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 2004).
413. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-7-7 (Michie 2004).
414. Id.
415. TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-13-203(a) (2003).
416. TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-13-203(c) (2003).
417. Id.
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voters who are eligible to vote for the office for which the candidate is run-
418
ning. Nominating petitions for independent presidential candidates must
be signed by the candidate and twenty-five or more registered voters for each
elector.419 Each independent candidate must note the full number of electors
allocated to the state.420
Texas: In order to have the names of it nominees placed on the general elec-
tion ballot, a political party required to make nominations by convention
must file with the Secretary of State lists of precinct convention participants
which must equal at least 1% of the total number of votes received by all
candidates for governor in the most recent general election.421 To be entitled
to have its nominees for President and Vice President placed on the general
election ballot, a political party must hold a presidential primary election in
Texas if: 1) in the presidential election year, the party is required by Texas
law to nominate its candidates for state and county offices by primary elec-
tion; 2) a presidential primary election is authorized under the national party
rules; and 3) before January 1 of the presidential election year, the national
party has deemed that it will hold a national presidential nominating conven-
tion during the presidential election year.422 To qualify for a position on the
general election ballot, an independent candidate running for President must
apply for a position on the ballot and submit a petition with signatures equal-
ing at least 1% of the total vote received in the state by all candidates for
President in the most recent presidential general election.423
Utah: Registered political parties and candidates for President who are af-
filiated with a registered political party are able to participate in the Western
States Presidential Primary.424 When the nomination is for an office to be
filled by the voters of the entire state, the candidate must submit the nomina-
tion petition to the county clerk for certification when the petition has been
completed by at least 1000 registered voters living in the state.425
Vermont: A minor political party may have its candidate's name printed on
the general election ballot for any office for which major political parties
418. TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-5-101(4)(b)(1) (2003 & Supp. 2004).
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 181.005(a) (Vernon 2003).
422. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 191.001 (Vernon 2003).
423. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. §§ 192.032(a), (d) (Vernon 2003).
424. UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-9-802(2) (1953 & Supp. 2003).
425. UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-9-502(2)(a)(i) (1953 & Supp. 2003).
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nominate candidates by primary or for the offices of President and Vice
President of the United States.426 To constitute a valid nomination for Presi-
dential and Vice Presidential offices, a statement of nomination must contain
the signatures of at least 1000 voters qualified to vote in an election.427
Virginia: A group of qualified voters, not constituting a political party un-
der Virginia election law, may have the names of electors selected by the
group printed on the official ballot for the election of electors for President
and Vice President by filing a petition with the State Board that is signed by
at least 10,000 qualified voters and at least 400 qualified voters from each
congressional district.42 8
Washington: A minor political party may hold more than one convention
but may not nominate more than one candidate for any one partisan public
office or position.429 For the purpose of nominating candidates for the of-
fices of President and Vice President, a minor political party or independent
candidate holding multiple conventions may add together the number of sig-
natures supporting the candidate from each convention in order to obtain the
number required by section 29A.20.141.430 In order to nominate candidates
for the offices of President and Vice President, a nominating convention
must obtain and submit to the filing officer the signatures of at least 1000
registered voters from the state.431
West Virginia: Any political party which polled less than 10% of the total
vote cast only for Governor at the immediately preceding general election
may nominate candidates by party conventions, as long as the nominations
are made and the certificates filed within the time and manner proscribed by
section 3-5-23 or section 3-5-24.432 Groups of citizens not nominating by
primary or convention may nominate by petition, and the number of signa-
tures must equal at least 2% of the entire vote cast at the last preceding gen-
eral election for any statewide, congressional, or presidential candidate, but
in no event may the number be less than twenty-five.433
426. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2381(a)(2) (2002).
427. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2402(b)(1) (2002).
428. VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-543 (Michie 1950 & Supp. 2003); see also VA. CODE ANN. §
24.2-101 (Michie 1950 & Supp. 2003) (defining "political party").
429. WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.20.121(4) (Supp. 2005).
430. Id.
431. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 29A.20.141(2) (Supp. 2005).
432. W. VA. CODE § 3-5-22 (2002); see also W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 3-5-23, 24 (2002).
433. W. VA. CODE § 3-5-23(c) (2002).
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Wisconsin: In the case of candidates for the offices of President and Vice
President, the nomination papers must contain both candidates' names, the
office for which each candidate is nominated, each candidate's residence and
post-office address, and the party or principles they represent in five words
or less.434 The number of required signatures on nomination papers for inde-
pendent candidates running for statewide offices must equal at least 2000 but
no more than 4000 electors' signatures.435 For independent presidential elec-
tors intending to vote for the same candidates for President and Vice Presi-
dent, the number of required signatures must equal at least 2000 but no more
than 4000 electors' signatures.436
Wyoming: The only method in which minor political parties may nominate
candidates to be placed on the general election ballot is by party conven-
tion.437 A minor political party may never nominate by the primary election
process.438 A petition must be signed by those registered electors in the leg-
islative district or other political subdivision in which the petitioner will be a
candidate who are able to vote for the candidate.439 The petition must in-
clude signatures equaling at least 2% of the total number of votes cast for
representative in Congress in the last general election for the political subdi-
vision or legislative district for which the petition is filed.440
District of Columbia: A political party which does not qualify under sub-
section (d) of this section, 1-1001.08, may have its candidates for President
and Vice President printed on the general election ballot, so long as a petition
nominating the candidates for presidential electors is signed by at least 1% of
registered qualified electors of the District of Columbia as of July 1 of the
year in which the election is to be and is presented to the Board on or before
the third Tuesday in August preceding the day of the presidential election.44'
434. WIs. STAT. § 8.20(2)(c) (2004).
435. WIS. STAT. §§ 8.15(6), 8.20(4) (2004).
436. WIS. STAT. § 8.20(4) (2004).
437. W'YO. STAT. ANN. § 22-4-303 (Michie 2003).
438. Id.
439. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 22-5-304 (Michie 2003).
440. Id.
441. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1001.08(f) (2001); see also D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1001.08(d)
(2001).
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